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THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT IN NORTH 
CAROLINA* 
ALFRED L. BROPHY** & ELIZABETH TROUTMAN*** 
This Article places North Carolina into the social, political, and 
legal context of the movement in the United States that resulted in 
the sterilization of more than thirty thousand people from the 
1920s through the 1960s. We sketch the social and political 
arguments that were mobilized to support sterilization, as well as 
the jurisprudence that developed alongside these arguments from 
the 1910s through the 1930s. 
State courts were initially slow to accept sterilization until the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in 1927 in Buck v. Bell. 
Following this decision, courts and legislatures around the 
United States more readily accepted these practices, even as legal 
scholars expressed reservations about sterilization. For nearly 
two decades, until the United States’ entrance into World War II, 
sterilization was broadly accepted by courts. But the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma in 1942 
began to turn the tide against sterilization, as did unease with a 
procedure that was reminiscent of practices touted in Nazi 
Germany. Yet, even after Skinner v. Oklahoma and the end of 
World War II, as the rest of the nation began to abandon 
sterilization, sterilizations continued in North Carolina. 
The legal basis for allowing sterilization in North Carolina was 
that procedural safeguards could overcome any concerns about 
infringement of personal liberty. This same due process, 
however, ultimately required the state to develop machinery to 
facilitate sterilization. The Eugenics Board of North Carolina, 
the state board in charge of reviewing petitions from public 
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health officials for sterilization, produced pre-printed forms to 
hasten the approval of sterilizations. The Eugenics Board 
routinely granted the vast majority of sterilization petitions and 
the few sterilization orders that were challenged in court were 
regularly upheld. While the number of coerced sterilizations is 
unknown, the practice disproportionately impacted lower 
income, and later, female and African American, North 
Carolinians. 
Recent legislation in North Carolina provides modest payments 
to the victims of the state’s sterilization program. While payments 
for this concentrated episode of state infringement on personal 
liberty should be applauded, the group of recipients may be both 
under- and over-inclusive, and some victims have problems 
proving their entitlement to compensation. Nevertheless, the 
North Carolina legislation provides a model for legislative action 
in other states. This dark chapter of North Carolina history is 
critical to the legal community’s collective conscious, lest we 
again allow an administrative apparatus of the state to 
overshadow and obliterate our most dearly held freedoms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1943, Harvard Law School Professor Thomas Reed Powell 
published a lengthy analysis of the constitutionality of compulsory 
vaccination and sterilization in the North Carolina Law Review.1 
 
 1.  See generally Thomas R. Powell, Compulsory Vaccination and Sterilization: 
Constitutional Aspects, 21 N.C. L. REV. 253 (1943) (analyzing the constitutionality of 
compulsory sterilization and vaccination). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1871 (2016) 
1874 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
Powell offered guidance on constitutionally permissible public health 
measures from vaccination through sterilization. His article reads very 
much like the opinion of a legal realist with several references 
describing the ambiguous state of the law and difficulty in predicting 
the outcome of subsequent cases. He wrote towards the end of the 
article, “[i]f all this seems sadly vague and amorphous to those who 
extract certainties out of test tubes, it can only be answered that of 
such is the kingdom of jurisprudence.”2 
Powell thought that the twin Supreme Court precedents of Buck 
v. Bell3 in 1927 and Skinner v. Oklahoma4 in 1942 shined little “light 
on what they or their successors would do with milder eugenic 
measures, except to make clear that they would be zealous in insisting 
upon strong scientific support for the necessity and the efficacy of 
prophylactic prescriptions and upon adequate procedural safeguards 
in picking the persons subjected to them.”5 Later Powell observed 
that Skinner v. Oklahoma, which struck down Oklahoma’s law 
permitting sterilization of those convicted of three felonies, would not 
be a “stumbling block in the way of any sane public health program 
however much it may intrude on privacy and preclude self-
determination.”6 
Powell’s article was published while North Carolina was in the 
midst of a decades-long program of sterilization. Several years later, 
Duke Law Professor James Bradway—a famous figure in the 
development of legal aid and clinical education7—published a brief 
article that summarized North Carolina’s law regarding involuntary 
and voluntary sterilization.8 He included the good news for physicians 
that they were immune from civil liability for participation in what 
Bradway termed “involuntary sterilizations” ordered by the Eugenics 
Board of North Carolina (“Eugenics Board”), “except in the case of 
 
 2.  Id. at 264. 
 3.  274 U.S. 200 (1927). See generally ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME 
COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK (2016) 
(documenting the story of Carrie Buck and the Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. Bell). 
 4.  316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 5.  Powell, supra note 1, at 263. 
 6.  Id. at 264. 
 7.  See Guide to the John S. Bradway Papers, 1914–1949, DUKE U. LIBR. (Apr. 2014), 
http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/findingaids/uabradjs/ [https://perma.cc/85ZN-RU3G] 
(discussing Bradway’s importance to legal education). 
 8.  See generally John S. Bradway, The Legality of Human Sterilization in North 
Carolina, 11 N.C. MED. J. 250 (1950) (discussing the North Carolina law regarding 
sterilization procedures). 
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negligence in the performance of said operation.”9 Both Powell and 
Bradway lent strong academic support to the eugenics movement. 
They were part of a sophisticated intellectual defense of a system that 
drew substantial political support in North Carolina and throughout 
the United States from the early twentieth century to the post-World 
War II era.10 
In North Carolina and nationwide, public knowledge of and 
anger towards the history of forced and coerced sterilization has 
grown dramatically since the early 2000s. A number of events in the 
early 2000s increased public awareness. In recent years, the story of 
sterilization has been told in growing detail. These stories typically 
begin by discussing the early twentieth-century cases that successfully 
challenged sterilization programs11 and then trace the development of 
jurisprudence from Buck v. Bell in 192712 to Skinner v. Oklahoma in 
1942.13 They often highlight the persistence of the eugenics movement 
into the 1970s.14 Work to address past injustices and support for 
reparations has increased along with knowledge about sterilization 
programs. Within North Carolina, historian Johanna Schoen brought 
new details about the state’s program to light.15 Schoen’s research 
formed the basis for the Winston-Salem Journal’s serial coverage 
beginning around 2002, which highlighted the experience of 
individual victims of state-sponsored involuntary sterilizations.16 
 
 9.  Id. at 250 (quoting Act of April 5, 1933, ch. 224, sec. 16, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 
35, repealed by Act of Apr. 17, 2003, ch. 13, sec. 1, 2003 Sess. Laws 11, 11). 
 10.  See, e.g., PHILLIP A. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF 
INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 99–100, 137–39 (1991). 
 11.  See, e.g., Stephen Siegel, Justice Holmes, Buck v. Bell, and the History of Equal 
Protection, 90 MINN. L. REV. 106, 106–11 (2005). 
 12.  See PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, 
THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL, at ix–xiv (2008) (discussing the primary actors 
and underlying motivations behind Buck v. Bell and highlighting the historical 
implications of the decision). 
 13.  See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND 
THE NEAR-TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 13–16 (2008) (discussing the historical 
backdrop surrounding Skinner v. Oklahoma and the eugenics movement in the United 
States). 
 14.  See JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE & COERCION: BIRTH CONTROL, 
STERILIZATION, AND ABORTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 241–45 (2004); 
GREGORY MICHAEL DORR, SEGREGATION’S SCIENCE: EUGENICS AND SOCIETY IN 
VIRGINIA 221–24 (2008). 
 15.  See generally SCHOEN supra note 14 (documenting the role of the state in 
promoting sterilization and the eugenics movement in North Carolina). 
 16.  The serial coverage began in December 2002, when the Winston-Salem Journal 
published “Against Their Will.” Against Their Will, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Dec. 9, 2002), 
http://www.journalnow.com/specialreports/againsttheirwill/ [https://perma.cc/BKF5-
M34Y]; see also SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 18–19. 
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These revelations have catalyzed public officials to acknowledge 
the harm caused by state-sponsored sterilization programs. In May 
2002, Virginia Governor Mark Warner apologized for Virginia’s role 
in sterilization;17 that was shortly followed by an apology by Oregon 
Governor John Kitzhaber for Oregon’s role in sterilization in 
December 2002.18 North Carolina Governor Mike Easley issued an 
apology to victims in December of the same year.19 These statements 
were followed by apologies in January 2003 by South Carolina 
Governor Jim Hodges20 and in March 2003 by California Governor 
Gray Davis.21 The Georgia legislature issued a formal apology in 
March 2007,22 and the Indiana State Health Commissioner apologized 
in April 2007.23 Similarly, the United Methodist Church apologized in 
2008 for its support of eugenics.24 
In this context of increased public awareness, this Article seeks 
to trace the history of the eugenics movement within North Carolina. 
We first analyze the origins of the sterilization mindset of the early 
twentieth century, locating the push for sterilization in a combination 
 
 17.  Virginia Governor Apologizes for Eugenics Law, USA TODAY (May 2, 2002, 
11:15 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/02/virginia-eugenics.htm [https://
perma.cc/GG7K-46CZ]. 
 18.  Apology for Oregon Forced Sterilizations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2002), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/dec/03/nation/na-sterile3 [https://perma.cc/5BZC-6WHK]. 
 19.  Governor Easley wrote, “On behalf of the state I deeply apologize to the victims 
and their families for this past injustice, and for the pain and suffering they had to endure 
over the years.” Kevin Begos, Danielle Deaver & John Railey, Easley Apologizes to 
Sterilization Victims, WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 13, 2002, at A1; Jon Elliston, The state’s 
sterilizations, INDY WEEK (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/the-states-
sterilizations/Content?oid=1188229 [https://perma.cc/2Z2M-B358]. North Carolina also 
repealed legislation that permitted the involuntary sterilization of developmentally 
disabled adults. Act of Apr. 17, 2003, ch. 13, 2003 N.C. Sess. Law 11. 
 20.  Peter Irons, Forced Sterilization a Stain on California, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2003), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/16/opinion/oe-irons16 [https://perma.cc/ST82-2UD9]. 
 21.  Carl Ingram, State Issues Apology for Policy of Sterilization, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 
2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/12/local/me-sterile12 [https://perma.cc/6QFL-
XVLY]; see also Mark G. Bold, Editorial, It’s Time for California to Compensate Its 
Forced-Sterilization Victims, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015, 8:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com
/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0306-bold-forced-sterilization-compensation-20150306-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/39BW-J27N] (noting the 2003 apology by Governor Gray Davis). 
 22.  S. Res. 247, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007) (“[B]E IT RESOLVED 
BY THE SENATE that the members of this body express their profound regret for 
Georgia’s participation in the eugenics movement and the injustices done under eugenics 
laws, including the forced sterilization of Georgia citizens.”). 
 23.  Ken Kusmer, Indiana Apologizes for Role in Eugenics, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 
2007, 9:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/13
/AR2007041300259_pf.html [https://perma.cc/ZG3D-Y3QR]. 
 24.  UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, RESOLUTION 3184: REPENTANCE FOR SUPPORT 
OF EUGENICS (2008), reprinted in THE BOOK OF RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED 
METHODIST CHURCH 312–18 (2012). 
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of threads, from concern with government expenditures on social 
welfare spending to unabashed white supremacy. Initially, the state 
courts resisted this movement, but as support grew—from the college 
classroom to the popular press—the balance shifted. Particularly in 
the wake of decisions in Michigan, Virginia, and the United States 
Supreme Court, eugenics gained substantial support among courts 
and legislatures. 
This Article explores North Carolina’s role in the eugenics 
movement and the long road to North Carolina’s reparations 
program.25 Between 1929 and 1974, North Carolina authorized the 
sterilization of nearly 7,600 people under the state’s 1929 sterilization 
law and subsequent North Carolina Eugenics Board program.26 North 
Carolina ranked third nationwide in the number of people sterilized; 
only California and Virginia sterilized more people.27 While North 
Carolina joined this movement and vigorously promoted sterilization, 
some voices were raised in opposition, particularly in law reviews. 
Even though the Supreme Court of the United States turned against 
sterilization in 1942, sterilization in North Carolina continued for 
decades, even after many other states had abandoned this practice.28 
While this Article maps the nationwide movement for 
sterilization, from its beginnings and growth through the increasing 
opposition and eventual decline, the focus of this Article is North 
Carolina’s role in the movement. Through this lens, North Carolina 
serves as an example of how legal theory morphed into a 
comprehensive state program of sterilization. This Article seeks to 
 
 25.  See infra Section VI.A (discussing the North Carolina reparations program). 
 26.  THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE TO DETERMINE THE METHOD OF COMP. FOR 
VICTIMS OF N.C.’S EUGENICS BD., FINAL REPORT 1, 5 (2012) [hereinafter GOVERNOR’S 
TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT], http://www.sterilizationvictims.nc.gov/documents/FinalReport
-GovernorsEugenicsCompensationTaskForce.pdf [https://perma.cc/535C-H3FX]. While there 
are no documented sterilization procedures under North Carolina’s first sterilization law 
of 1919, forty-nine people were sterilized pursuant to the state’s 1929 sterilization law 
prior to the Supreme Court of North Carolina striking it down as unconstitutional in 1933. 
Id. As part of the revised 1933 sterilization law, the general assembly created a five-
member Eugenics Board to oversee the state’s sterilization program. Id.; see infra Section 
V.B. (discussing the 1933 sterilization law and administration of sterilization in North 
Carolina). 
 27.  Kim Severson, Thousands Sterilized, a State Weighs Restitution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/redress-weighed-for-forced-sterilizations-
in-north-carolina.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5QYV-V4PD]. 
 28.  See Kevin Begos, Lifting the Curtain on a Shameful Era, WINSTON-SALEM J. 
(Dec. 9, 2002, 12:00 AM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/lifting-the-curtain-on-a-
shameful-era/article_fa19404e-8fdf-11e2-8fba-0019bb30f31a.html [https://perma.cc/4LBZ-
G9C5] (noting that North Carolina’s sterilization program was unique compared to those 
in other states due to its dramatic expansion after 1945). 
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understand how North Carolina government actors selected people 
for sterilization, approved sterilization, and carried out the 
procedures. There remain unanswered questions as to the 
circumstances of individual sterilizations in the state. 
Despite North Carolina’s long history with eugenics—or maybe 
in part because of it—our state has recently taken the lead in 
providing compensation for sterilization victims. To conclude, this 
Article turns to the North Carolina reparations program which has 
provided for compensation for sterilization victims.29 Drawing from 
the North Carolina precedent, we make the case for legislative action 
to provide reparations in other states. Even if claimants cannot 
demonstrate that the sterilization was wholly “involuntary,” they 
should still be able to receive relief. Also, this Article suggests 
limiting factors that counsel in favor of compensation for sterilization 
victims without opening the door to reparations claims in other 
settings. 
I.  THE EUGENICS ERA 
A. The Sterilization Mindset: 1910s and 1920s 
The idea of state-compelled sterilizations emerged with strength 
in the 1910s from several lines of thought. A review of the eugenics 
literature during this period reveals three primary motivations behind 
what could be termed the “sterilization mindset”: first, the search for 
scientific solutions to human problems; second, the growing 
population of non-white people in the United States and worldwide 
posed threats to white supremacy; and third, the belief that 
sterilization would reduce government expenditures and thus was 
justified under a cost-benefit analysis. Together, these motivations 
served as the driving force behind the eugenics movement in the 
United States. 
First, the search for scientific solutions to human problems 
represents a common theme within eugenics literature. One of the 
first such works in the United States was published by Harvard 
University Zoology Professor Charles Davenport, who wrote in the 
first decade of the twentieth century about eugenics in The Science of 
Human Improvement by Better Breeding.30 This brief work focused on 
what traits are inherited and how likely offspring are to inherit a 
 
 29.  See infra Section VI.A (discussing the North Carolina reparations program). 
 30.  C.B. DAVENPORT, EUGENICS: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN IMPROVEMENT BY 
BETTER BREEDING (1910). 
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particular trait.31 Davenport framed this study as fairly neutral, 
designed to inform those thinking about marriage and whether their 
partner would help them have healthy and intelligent children.32 The 
upshot of the pamphlet was to warn that mentally disabled parents 
would likely have mentally disabled children, too.33 It was a short step 
from advising potential parents of the likely outcome of a marriage to 
the more general concern by the state of reproduction and control 
over the rights of people it deemed undesirable. 
The literature during this period built upon the supposed 
inheritance of mental deficiency, providing a critical justification for 
the eugenics movement. Henry Goddard’s 1912 book The Kallikak 
Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness popularized the 
idea that mental ability and criminal tendencies were inherited traits 
and that people of low intelligence and those predisposed to crime 
were more likely to have “feeble-minded” children than those of high 
intelligence.34 Goddard’s book was followed in 1915 by a study of the 
Juke family by Arthur Estabrook.35 Vignettes about families like the 
Kallikaks and the Jukes were so popular that they were repeated by 
local officials seeking to support the case for sterilization.36 In 1918, 
Paul Popenoe, a eugenics activist educated at Occidental College and 
later Stanford University, and University of Pittsburgh Professor 
Roswell Hill Johnson, addressed arguments in favor of eugenics in 
their textbook Applied Eugenics.37 They built further upon this 
common narrative of inherited mental deficiency.38 
In the ensuing years, many adherents approached eugenics not 
just as a mechanism for human improvement, but also as financially 
 
 31.  Id. at 3–4. 
 32.  Id. at 3. 
 33.  Id. at 14–16. 
 34.  See HENRY HERBERT GODDARD, THE KALLIKAK FAMILY: A STUDY IN THE 
HEREDITY OF FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 67–69 (1912). 
 35.  See generally ARTHUR HOWARD ESTABROOK, THE JUKES IN 1915 (1916) 
(documenting the study of the Juke family in New York). 
 36.  See, e.g., N.C. STATE BD. OF CHARITIES AND PUB. WELFARE, BIENNIAL 
REPORT: DECEMBER 1, 1920 TO JUNE 30, 1922, at 99 (1922) (discussing the “Wake 
family”). There was, in fact, a small genre of literature that explored the problems across 
several generations of families. See, e.g., CHARLES B. DAVENPORT & ARTHUR H. 
ESTABROOK, THE NAM FAMILY: A STUDY IN CACOGENICS 1 (1912); CHARLES B. 
DAVENPORT & FLORENCE H. DANIELSON, THE HILL FOLK: REPORT ON A RURAL 
COMMUNITY OF HEREDITARY DEFECTIVES 1 (1912); see also MARK H. HALLER, 
EUGENICS: HEREDITERIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 108 (1963) 
(summarizing several family studies). 
 37.  See Paul Popenoe, Preface to the First Edition of PAUL POPENOE & ROSWELL 
HILL JOHNSON, APPLIED EUGENICS, at v, vi (1st ed. 1918). 
 38.  See POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 84–89. 
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conservative public policy. In 1922, the North Carolina State Board of 
Public Welfare followed Goddard’s model.39 The Board conducted a 
study of a family it labeled the “Wake family” (a pseudonym given 
based on their residence in Wake County, where the state capitol of 
Raleigh is located).40 After recounting the origins of the parents and 
the problems with their five children, the report concluded by arguing 
that people like the “Wake family” should be prohibited from having 
children.41 It was an argument based on utility and economics: 
The tragedy of this story is not so much the drunkenness and 
immorality this feebleminded family is responsible for, but the 
sheer waste—the lack of any sort of worth-while contribution to 
society	.	.	.	. Twenty thousand dollars or more has probably 
been as heedlessly poured out on this family. 
Had Joe and Mary been refused a marriage license on the 
ground of feeblemindedness—as is done in a number of 
states—and sent to an institution, the State would have been 
spared much expense and trouble. Had they been rendered 
incapable of having children they could not have been more 
diseased than they are, and still society would have been spared 
a second generation of their kind.42 
Fifteen years later in 1938, the Eugenics Board again turned to the 
example of the “Wake family” in a pamphlet to explain the rationale 
behind eugenics.43 The Board used the family to demonstrate the 
 
 39. See N.C. STATE BD. OF CHARITIES AND PUB. WELFARE, supra note 36, at 98–99. 
 40.  Id. at 99. 
 41.  Id. at 102–03. 
 42.  Id. See generally Anna L. Krome-Lukens, “A Great Blessing to Defective 
Humanity”: Women and the Eugenics Movement in North Carolina, 1910–1940 (2009) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina) (discussing the reform impulse in 
North Carolina and support for eugenics) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 43.  R. EUGENE BROWN, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN 
NORTH CAROLINA: PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURE 9–10 
(1938) [hereinafter BROWN, PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURE], 
http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p249901coll22/id/417353/rec/3 [https://
perma.cc/RL4V-XTKH]. The Eugenics Board published Eugenical Sterilization in North 
Carolina to provide information about basic procedures for sterilization and forms for 
public health officials to use in petitioning the Board for permission to sterilize individuals. 
Id. at 11–14; see also R. EUGENE BROWN, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., EUGENICAL 
STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF 
EUGENICAL STERILIZATION AND A REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE EUGENICS BOARD 
OF NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH JUNE 30, 1935, at 12–15 (1935) [hereinafter BROWN, A 
BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION], http://digital.ncdcr
.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p249901coll22/id/417374/show/417354 [https://perma.cc/
L4DV-8LWP]. 
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costs of public welfare and the cost savings of sterilization.44 This 
analysis concluded, “[a]t the end of 1922	.	.	.	the family had cost the 
public at least $20,000	.	.	.	. For the cost of around $100.00 the father 
and mother of these children could have been sterilized.”45 Such cold 
economic calculations were central to the case for sterilization. 
Popenoe and Johnson’s college textbook stated the problem in 
similarly stark economic terms. The financial burden of caring for 
“defectives and delinquents	.	.	.	is becoming a heavy one; it will 
become a crushing one	.	.	.	. The burden can never be wholly 
obliterated, but it can be largely reduced by a restriction of the 
reproduction of those who are themselves socially inadequate.”46 
They argued further that restrictions on personal liberty were 
necessary for the preservation of the race.47 
Works like Edward Gosney and Paul Popenoe’s Sterilization for 
Human Betterment told of the opportunities for harnessing science to 
improve lives.48 Gosney and Popenoe’s book, published in 1929, after 
California had already sterilized several thousand people, dealt with 
the state’s experience with eugenics.49 By minimizing the harms to 
individuals and by focusing on the cost saved by California taxpayers, 
they made the case for sterilization more generally.50 The need for 
sterilization had oddly resulted from improving standards of medical 
care, which meant that people, who in previous generations would 
have died, now lived to have children.51 The book’s thesis is that “[w]e 
need constructive charity along with our present patchwork variety 
that tends to increase the burdens of race degeneracy and family 
suicide.”52 That is, Gosney and Popenoe wanted a policy that was no 
 
 44.  BROWN, PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURE, supra 
note 43, at 10. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 173. 
 47.  Id. at 174. 
 48.  E.S. GOSNEY & PAUL POPENOE, STERILIZATION FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT: A 
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF 6,000 OPERATIONS IN CALIFORNIA, 1909–1920, at viii 
(1929). One might note here the shift in book title, from Davenport’s subtitle of The 
Science of Human Improvement by Better Breeding to Gosney and Popenoe’s Sterilization 
for Human Betterment. Human improvement was key to both books, but in Davenport’s 
1910 pamphlet the improvement was primarily through voluntary action. See 
DAVENPORT, supra note 30, at 3–4. But see id. at 33–34 (noting sterilization may be 
needed for criminals as well as the mentally ill). For Gosney and Popenoe, improvement 
was to come through compulsory sterilization. See GOSNEY & POPENOE, supra, at 116 
(outlining the justifications for sterilization in the interest of the state). 
 49.  GOSNEY & POPENOE, supra note 48, at ix–x. 
 50.  Id. at 129–31. 
 51.  Id. at v. 
 52.  Id. 
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longer “patchwork” charity designed to address poverty and need 
once a child had been born; in its place, they wanted a policy that 
stopped some from having children and encouraged others of “good 
stock” to have more.53 
Second, the eugenics literature also lamented the decline of the 
white race. Paul Popenoe and Roswell Hill Johnson’s 1918 college 
textbook, Applied Eugenics, opened in apocalyptic terms with 
reference to the demographic catastrophe of the recent world war and 
the threatened decline of the white race.54 Popenoe and Johnson 
distilled an argument that had been extensively developed by others. 
Even before the Great War, there was a robust literature warning of 
the decline of white supremacy. Madison Grant’s The Passing of the 
Great Race, published in 1916, was an important popular work that 
raised the fear that the Nordic race was being overwhelmed, 
particularly in the United States.55 
Grant’s argument was amplified by other literature that warned 
of non-European people increasing in proportion to Europeans in the 
wake of the World War.56 One of the most dramatic examples of this 
literature was Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color Against 
White Supremacy, published in 1920 by Charles Scribner’s Sons.57 The 
introductory paragraph laid out the dire situation, as Stoddard saw it, 
associated with the decline of the power of people of European 
descent.58 Europeans had as recently as 1914 dominated Europe, 
North America, and Australia.59 Drawing from the extensive reach of 
the European colonial powers and their American counterpart, 
Stoddard presented a story of white supremacy in which “vast areas 
inhabited by uncounted myriads of dusky folk obeyed the white 
 
 53.  Id. at 122–24. 
 54.  Edward Alsworth Ross, Introduction to POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 
xi. 
 55.  See JONATHAN PETER SPIRO, DEFENDING THE MASTER RACE: 
CONSERVATION, EUGENICS, AND THE LEGACY OF MADISON GRANT 167 (2009). See 
generally MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (1916) (arguing the 
Nordic race was in decline in the United States due to the influx of immigrants). 
 56.  See SPIRO, supra note 55, at 167; Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: 
Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of American Law, 1900–1930, 16 L. & HIST. 
REV. 63, 98–99 (1998). 
 57.  See generally LOTHROP STODDARD, THE RISING TIDE OF COLOR AGAINST 
WHITE WORLD-SUPREMACY (1920) (warning of the decline of the white race due to the 
population growth and migration of people of other races). 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59.  Id. (“Judged by accepted canons of statecraft, the white man towered the 
indisputable master of the planet. Forth from Europe’s teeming mother-hive the 
imperious Sons of Japhet had swarmed for centuries to plant their laws, their customs, and 
their battle-flags at the uttermost ends of the earth.”). 
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man’s will.”60 Much had changed in only a few years. In the wake of 
World War I, the power of people of European descent was declining 
as their former colonies began to loosen the bonds of colonialism. 
Something needed to be done about it. The answer was found partly 
in eugenics. 
Stoddard’s message of white supremacy reached a wide 
audience, infusing the debate surrounding the eugenics movement. 
Scribner’s, an important trade press, published The Rising Tide of 
Color, facilitating access to the general public.61 Another indicator 
that Stoddard had reached a public audience is his appearance in F. 
Scott Fitzgerald’s novel, The Great Gatsby. Tom Buchanan, a 
character in that novel who was known more for his impulsive action 
than his thoughtfulness, spoke about eugenics.62 But he combined 
Henry Goddard’s name with a misstatement of Lothrop Stoddard’s 
book title when he asked, “Have you read ‘The Rise of the Colored 
Empires’ by this man Goddard?”63 Goddard’s book title was The 
Kallikak Family.64 It was Stoddard’s book that was titled The Rising 
Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy.65 Fitzgerald’s 
reference suggests (in addition to the fact that Tom Buchanan was not 
very serious as a thinker or reader) that both Goddard’s Kallikak 
Family and Stoddard’s Rising Tide of Color were on Buchanan’s mind 
just as the concern for white supremacy was on the minds of 
Americans in the 1920s. 
Stoddard made several references to eugenics in The Rising Tide 
of Color, including in its conclusion.66 Echoing W.E.B. Du Bois, but 
 
 60.  Id. Stoddard began his scholarly life criticizing the Haitian Revolution, which had 
freed Haiti from slavery and French colonialism. See T. LOTHROP STODDARD, THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO, at vii (1914). 
 61.  Originally founded in 1846, Charles Scribner’s Sons was a prominent publishing 
company during this period and published the works of several prominent authors at the 
time, including Ring Larder, Earnest Hemingway, Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, and F. Scott 
Fitzgerald. See About Scribner, SCRIBNER, http://www.simonandschusterpublishing.com/
scribner/about-scribner.html [https://perma.cc/Z4MN-THG9]. 
 62.  F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 13 (1925). 
 63.  Id. Buchanan goes on to explain that, “it’s a fine book and everybody ought to 
read it. The idea is if we don’t look out the white race will be—will be utterly submerged. 
It’s all scientific stuff; it’s been proved.” Id. One wonders whether the fact that Scribner’s 
published Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, as well as Madison Grant’s The Passing of the 
Great Race and Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color, influenced Fitzgerald’s reference to 
Stoddard. 
 64.  GODDARD, supra note 34. 
 65.  STODDARD, supra note 57. 
 66.  Id. at 306; see also id. at 220 (“Bolsheivism has vowed the proletarianzation of the 
world, beginning with the white peoples. To this end it not only foments social revolution 
within the white world itself, but it also seeks to enlist the colored races in its grand assault 
on civilization.”). 
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viewing the issue from the other side of the color line, Stoddard wrote 
in his preface: 
The world-wide struggle between the primary races of 
mankind—the “conflict of color” as it has been happily 
termed—bids fair to be the fundamental problem of the 
twentieth century, and great communities like the United States 
of America, the South African Confederation, and Australasia 
regard the “color question” as perhaps the gravest problem of 
the future.67 
In the conclusion, Stoddard linked the fate of the white race to that of 
eugenics. He looked forward to a future when white Americans 
would “take in hand the problem of race-depredation, and 
segregation of defectives and abolition of handicaps penalizing the 
better stock	.	.	.	.”68 At that point, he argued, “[I]t will be possible to 
inaugurate positive measures of race-betterment which will 
unquestionably yield the most wonderful results.”69 
The white supremacy literature advanced two central themes 
that informed the underlying goals of the eugenics movement: first, 
the need to address the proliferation of undesirable non-European 
people, and second, the need for people of European descent to have 
more children. Popenoe and Johnson’s textbook, Applied Eugenics, 
argued that well-educated people (particularly women) were not 
having enough children.70 However, the eugenics literature also 
addressed the need for restrictions on reproduction for some people 
of all races. Samuel J. Holmes’ 1921 book, The Trend of the Race, 
argued that “[t]he fact that defective mentality is strongly transmitted 
is established beyond the possibility of sane objection, and the 
particularly disastrous results that are pretty sure to follow from the 
mating of two mentally defectives have certainly been made 
 
 67.  Id. at v (quoting STODDARD, supra note 60, at vii). In support of this claim, 
Stoddard quoted the following passage from Du Bois: 
These nations and races, composing as they do a vast majority of humanity, are 
going to endure this treatment just as long as they must and not a moment longer. 
Then they are going to fight and the War of the Color Line will outdo in savage 
inhumanity any war this world has yet seen. 
Id. at 14 (quoting W. E. Burghardt DuBois, The African Roots of War, 115 ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 707, 714 (1915)). 
 68.  Id. at 309. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 240–42 (concluding that women 
educated at elite colleges were harming the future of the white race because they married 
less often and later in life). 
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sufficiently impressive by the work of recent investigators.”71 For this 
reason, the literature on the eugenics movement can be viewed as a 
potent mixture of white supremacy, state regulation, and patriarchy. 
Faced with these growing concerns, there was a concerted 
attempt to use the state’s power to implement such solutions. World 
War I, which had seen such extraordinary growth in the power of the 
United States and had resulted in such extraordinary destruction of 
lives and property in Europe, perhaps taught that generation of 
Americans that it was appropriate for the state to exercise such 
power. This attitude continued a trend of expansive government 
regulation—from regulation of business, such as rates in interstate 
commerce, protections for workers, and zoning—that had begun 
before the War.72 This same attitude, focused on the supposed good 
to the general public, supported the view that the state could and 
should circumscribe the rights of individuals.73 And so, over the 
 
 71.  SAMUEL J. HOLMES, THE TREND OF THE RACE: A STUDY OF PRESENT 
TENDENCIES IN THE BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZED MANKIND 40 (1921); 
see also Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 141, 141–42 (Mich. 1925). 
 72.  See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE 
CRISIS OF AMERICAN LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 1870–1960, at 145–68, 213–46 (1992) 
(discussing regulation of property and business during the Progressive era); Paul Kens, 
The Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 
1900–1937, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70, 70–73 (1995) (locating the “myth” of the Lochner 
era within the time of non-regulation in the Progressive era); see also Vill. of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding local regulation of land use 
through zoning); Muller v.	Oregon,	208 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1908) (upholding a state statute 
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Constitution and Business Regulation in the Progressive Era: Recent Developments and 
New Opportunities, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97, 98–101 (2016) (discussing conflicting 
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entire era. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92 TEX. L. REV. 383, 
394 (2013) (reviewing BRYAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST 
DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010)) (discussing literature on Lochner 
era). The Court’s reasoning in Lochner was rejected in cases like Muller, 208 U.S. at 423, 
and later in cases like Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397, and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). It 
is perhaps not coincidental that Justice Holmes, the dissenter in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74, 
was the author of the majority in Buck, 272 U.S. at 200. Moreover, particularly after 1910, 
there was growing support for pervasive government regulation. And as Herbert 
Hovenkamp has shown recently, there were multiple strands of economic thought in 
circulation at the time, each of which supported a regulatory approach. See HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 
1870–1970, at 7 (2015). 
 73. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
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course of the 1920s and 1930s, state legislatures enacted legislation to 
provide for widespread sterilization, and courts began to routinely 
uphold such legislation. 
How the three branches of state government came together to 
implement such solutions is discussed at length below. All three 
motivations—the quest for scientific solutions to human problems, 
the concern for white supremacy, and the belief that the government 
could and should address these concerns—merged together to 
provide a powerful impetus for the state-sponsored sterilization of 
approximately sixty thousand people from the 1920s through the 
1950s in the United States.74 
B. Making the Case for Sterilization 
The panic in the eugenics and white supremacy literature 
translated well into arguments for legislative action. Concerns over 
decline of the white race and the need for legislative action were 
phrased starkly as concerns over costs of care and the decreasing 
mental ability of American citizens.75 
One can trace the migration of eugenic ideas into public debate 
by looking at the revised and expanded version of Paul Popenoe and 
Roswell Johnson’s college textbook, Applied Eugenics, from its first 
edition in 1918 to its second edition in 1933.76 The book made the case 
for sterilization with an attack on the common people, arguing that 
the wealthier and better-educated people were being overtaken by 
the common people.77 For instance, the authors focused on the 
fertility of women educated at elite colleges, noting that well-
educated women were having too few children.78 They noted that 
“[s]ince the greatest eugenics wastage at the present time is among 
college-educated women, these need particular help to orient 
 
 74.  MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED 
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (2007); Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: “Felt 
Necessities” v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1439, 1446 (1981) 
(emphasizing the role of “scientific” thought in Buck v. Bell and its contribution to the 
case). 
 75.  See infra Section II.B. 
 76.  See PAUL POPENOE & ROSWELL HILL JOHNSON, APPLIED EUGENICS, at v (rev. 
ed. 1933) (describing the purpose and underlying motivations behind the revised edition). 
 77. Id. at 136–37 (making the case for negative eugenics); id. at 288–90 (discussing the 
impact of immigration on the racial makeup of the United States); Edward Alsworth Ross, 
Introduction to POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at xi. 
 78. See POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 261; POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra 
note 37, at 262–65 (discussing relevant studies on the birth rates of educated women). 
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themselves.”79 The authors simultaneously argued that college-
educated women should be encouraged to have more children, while 
other women—and men—should be denied the right to procreation.80 
Thus, there was a coercive side of the eugenics story, which both 
prevented procreation when people wanted it and encouraged it when 
they did not. 
In their 1933 revised and expanded version of their textbook, 
Popenoe and Johnson provided a series of exercises for students, 
which were designed to transfer the eugenics movement from the 
classroom into the realm of advocacy. For instance, they asked: 
If you were a state legislator, would you think it more 
important at your first session to work for a sterilization bill, or 
to get appropriations for additional segregation facilities? 
Why?81 
Inquire of several persons whom you consider ultra-
conservative and several others whom you consider to be 
radically-minded, whether they approve of eugenics. Classify 
their answers.82 
Discuss in some detail the selective nature of deaths from 
automobile accidents.83 
If there is a considerable foreign-born population in your 
community, tabulate the birth announcements in the 
newspapers for a few weeks and classify them, so far as can be 
done by family names, on the basis of their nationality.84 
Ask 10 students how many brothers and sisters they have. Note 
how many of them come from families that are large enough to 
perpetuate themselves.85 
A philanthropist is contemplating a bequest for the 
advancement of eugenics. He is in doubt as to whether he 
should leave this to promote (a) research on the genetics of 
human traits, or (b) work along educational and legislative lines 
 
 79.  POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 261; POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 
37, at 265 (noting the disparity in birth rates among educated women and suggesting that 
“education is tending toward race suicide”). 
 80.  POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 136–37, 261; POPENOE & JOHNSON, 
supra note 37, at 262–65. 
 81.  POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 408. 
 82.  Id. at 413. 
 83.  Id. at 406. 
 84.  Id. at 407. 
 85.  Id. 
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to put the eugenic program into effect. He asks your advice. 
What have you to say?86 
Which do you think is the superior right: the right of every 
individual to marry and have children, or the right of society to 
prevent the reproduction of the unfit? Why?87 
This was by no means some fringe academic endeavor, but one that 
was embraced by academic institutions. During this period, eugenics 
was taught at 376 colleges and universities across the country.88 
Through this type of “education,” eugenics ideas flowed from popular 
culture into the legislature, and then were approved by the courts.89 
As Greg Dorr has shown, eugenics ideas were popular and frequently 
taught at the University of Virginia from the early 1900s through 
World War II.90 At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
famed sociology professor Rupert Vance taught, for several years, a 
course on population that addressed “problems of race, immigration, 
and eugenics.”91 Even though Vance’s book Human Factors in Cotton 
Production attributed problems with rural poverty to environment 
rather than heredity,92 Vance’s portrayal of rural poverty and the 
difficulty those in poverty faced in struggling out of it seems to have 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  COHEN, supra note 3, at 4; see also POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at v 
(noting the prior edition’s “widespread use as a college textbook”). 
 89.  Popenoe and Johnson’s conclusion was that the state would sometimes need to 
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facility should be available to undesirable parents for the prevention of conception, but 
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Samuel J. Holmes’ 1936 textbook Human Genetics and Its Social Import included a final 
chapter entitled “Proposed Measures for Race Betterment.” SAMUEL J. HOLMES, 
HUMAN GENETICS AND ITS SOCIAL IMPORT 359 (1936). It presented a number of 
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Id. at 385–86. 
 90.  DORR, supra note 14, at 70–72, 106–07. 
 91.  See UNIV. OF N.C., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA RECORD: THE 
GENERAL CATALOGUE, CATALOGUE ISSUE 1937–1938, at 224 (1938), http://library
.digitalnc.org/cdm/ref/collection/yearbooks/id/12731 [https://perma.cc/6FT8-WTLV]; UNIV. OF 
N.C., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA RECORD: THE GENERAL CATALOGUE, 
CATALOGUE ISSUE 1938–1939, at 263 (1939), http://library.digitalnc.org/cdm/ref/collection
/yearbooks/id/12897 [https://perma.cc/G93F-8URB]. 
 92.  RUPERT B. VANCE, HUMAN FACTORS IN COTTON CULTURE: A STUDY IN THE 
SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 295 (1929) (“There exists a kind of 
natural harmony about the cotton system. Its parts fit together so perfectly as to suggest 
the fatalism of design.”). 
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supported the idea that something had to be done, perhaps through 
eugenics.93 Before Vance, the course was taught by T.J. Woofter,94 
whose 1933 book Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life spoke of 
problems with assimilation of foreign-born migrants.95 
C. The Legal Mindset: 1910s and 1920s 
The ideas generated in the public and scholarly eugenics 
movement migrated quickly into the legislative and judicial spheres. 
The first eugenics legislation in the United States was passed in 1907 
in Indiana.96 By 1922, Harry Laughlin presented a model sterilization 
statute in his extended study, Eugenical Sterilization in the United 
States.97 He later described sterilization as an important component of 
state policy “to control both the quality and quantity of its future 
population.”98 Laughlin acknowledged in 1926 that Michigan and 
Virginia had already upheld broad eugenics laws99 and suggested that 
the legislation should apply to people in both state institutions and 
the community.100 His pamphlet provided two new model statutes 
based on what courts had already upheld.101 
State courts showed substantial unease with eugenics legislation 
in the 1910s and early 1920s. Courts reviewed two different types of 
statutes during this time: statutes that provided for sterilization of 
criminals and statutes that provided for sterilization of 
developmentally disabled people. Analysis of criminal sterilization 
considered whether sterilization was cruel and unusual punishment 
and whether imposition of a particular sterilization violated a criminal 
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 96.  Act of Mar. 9, 1907, ch. 215, 1907 Ind. Acts 377 (authorizing “the sterilization of 
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22 GEO. L.J. 616, 617 (1933–1934). 
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446–51 (1922) (providing model sterilization statute). 
 98.  HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION: 1926, at 2 (1926). 
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 101.  Id. at 64–75. 
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defendant’s right to due process.102 Analysis of non-criminal 
sterilization focused on equal protection challenges—allegations that 
some similarly situated people were not being sterilized.103  
Legal scholars debate whether Lochner v. New York104 and its 
jurisprudential era during the early twentieth century, remembered 
for its emphasis on “economic liberty,” facilitated the demise of 
substantive due process rights in favor of the general welfare105 or was 
actually a precursor to the establishment of the fundamental rights 
doctrine in the Warren court.106 While the eugenics cases of the early 
twentieth century do not answer such larger questions, they 
demonstrate that Griswold v. Connecticut107 was not the first time that 
the courts wrestled with whether a person has a right to make his or 
her own choices about whether to beget children.108 The courts 
articulated their concerns stridently in these early stages of 
sterilization decisions, albeit in their own language, on both criminal 
and non-criminal sterilizations. But across the country, states 
subsequently lowered their voices and changed the subject. 
Substantive questions turned to concerns about process as more and 
more statutes came before state courts. The focus was no longer on 
use of sterilization for punishment, but rather on general welfare. 
Slowly, the legal community went the way of popular thinking at the 
time and ultimately sanctioned sterilization statutes. While courts 
initially expressed skepticism of eugenics, they increasingly accepted 
sterilization programs as a valid exercise of state power. 
1.  The “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Perspective 
The first appellate case to address the constitutionality of 
sterilization legislation was the Washington Supreme Court’s 1912 
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opinion in State v. Feilen,109 which upheld a statute allowing 
vasectomies to be performed on men convicted of rape.110 The court 
held that since the crime was so heinous and vasectomies were 
relatively painless, the procedure was not cruel punishment.111 The 
court analyzed the issue as a balance between individual liberty and 
public welfare: “[W]e cannot hold that vasectomy is such a cruel 
punishment as cannot be inflicted upon appellant for the horrible and 
brutal crime [of rape] which he has been convicted.”112 
In another early case, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa in Davis v. Berry113 provided an extensive 
articulation of why sterilization is cruel and unusual punishment due 
to its infringement on a person’s basic rights: 
[E]ach operation is to destroy the power of procreation. It is, of 
course, to follow the man during the balance of his life. The 
physical suffering may not be so great, but that is not the only 
test of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the 
mental suffering are always present and known by all the 
public, and will follow him wheresoever he may go. This 
belongs to the Dark Ages.114 
The court drew particular emphasis on the degradation of the 
human body that accompanies sterilization.115 The court went so far as 
to imply that there exists a fundamental right to beget children, 
holding that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on a man’s right 
“to enter into the marital relation.”116 The United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada drew a similar conclusion in its 1918 
decision Mickle v. Henrichs.117 Applying this logic to the prisoner 
found guilty of rape, the court stated “[t]rue, rape is an infamous 
crime; the punishment should be severe; but even for such an 
offender the way to an upright life, if life is spared, should not be 
unnecessarily obstructed.”118 By arguing that sterilization “obstructs” 
a person’s ability to lead an upright life, the court conceptualized 
procreation as fundamental to living life. 
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2.  Fundamental Rights in Equal Protection Challenges 
Sterilization statutes also raised constitutional concerns under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Equal protection challenges to 
sterilization statutes arose from individuals being institutionalized for 
“feeble-mindedness” or other mental health reasons, as opposed to 
the cruel and unusual punishment challenges furthered by convicted 
criminals. Courts were quick to note that the state, by having a 
sterilization option for only those confined to state institutions and 
not for those people with the same ailments living outside institutions, 
was treating people in the same class differently.119 In its In re 
Thompson120 decision in 1918, the Albany County Supreme Court of 
the State of New York held a sterilization board unconstitutional on 
the grounds that “[t]he law certainly denies to some persons of a class 
and similarly situated the protection which is afforded to others of the 
same class.”121 In the same year, the Michigan Supreme Court struck 
down a similar statute on similar grounds, explaining: 
[T]he Legislature selected out of what might be termed a 
natural class of defective and incompetent persons only those 
already under public restraint, leaving immune from its 
operation all others of like kind to whom the reason for the 
legislative remedy is normally and equally, at least, applicable, 
extending immunities and privileges to the latter which are 
denied to the former.122 
Moreover, these courts found that the class distinction did not 
accomplish the objectives for which the sterilization program was 
established, since institutionalized persons were less likely to 
procreate than non-institutionalized people anyway.123 
But the discussion often extended beyond the unreasonableness 
of this distinction into the realm of why sterilization raised such large 
 
 119.  See, e.g., In re Thomson, 169 N.Y.S. 638, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918), aff’d sub nom., 
Osborn v. Thomson, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918); Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit 
Judge, 166 N.W. 938, 940 (Mich. 1918). 
 120.  169 N.Y.S. 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918). 
 121.  Id. at 644. 
 122.  Haynes, 166 N.W. at 940. 
 123.  See, e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963, 966 (N.J. 1913) 
(“The objection, however, is not that the class is small as compared with the magnitude of 
the purpose in view, which is nothing less than the artificial improvement of society at 
large, but that it is singularly inept for the accomplishment of that purpose in this respect, 
viz., that if such object requires the sterilization of the class so selected, then a fortiori does 
it require the sterilization of the vastly greater class who are not protected from 
procreation by their confinement in state or county institutions.”). 
94. N.C. L. REV. 1871 (2016) 
2016] EUGENICS MOVEMENT IN N.C. 1893 
concerns in the first place. In In re Thompson, the New York court 
declared that: 
The entire purpose of the enactment seems to be to save 
expense to future generations in the operation of eleemosynary 
institutions	.	.	.	. Such does not seem to this court to be the 
proper exercise of the police power. It seems to be a tendency 
almost inhuman in its nature.124 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey likewise labeled its state’s 
sterilization statute inhumane, noting “[t]he palpable inhumanity and 
immorality of such a scheme forbids us to impute it to an enlightened 
Legislature.”125 The court’s opinion foreshadowed just how dangerous 
involuntary sterilization could be for society: 
There are other things besides physical or mental diseases that 
may render persons undesirable citizens, or might do so in the 
opinion of a majority of a prevailing Legislature. Racial 
differences, for instance, might afford a basis for such an 
opinion in communities where that question is unfortunately a 
permanent and paramount issue.126 
The court clearly stated that once the government starts 
sterilizing on “feeble-mindedness” grounds, race and poverty could 
logically follow as valid reasons to refuse the right of procreation. 
This prediction was eerily prescient considering that a 
disproportionate number of people sterilized in North Carolina were 
indeed poor and black.127 
3.  From Substantive Concerns to Procedural Safeguards 
After these early cases, however, the tone began to shift. Courts 
struggled with the distinction between this new idea of substantive 
rights, which the United States Supreme Court had not yet fully 
articulated, particularly in the context of reproductive rights, and the 
simpler option of invalidating statutes on procedural due process 
grounds. Davis v. Berry opinion illustrates this tension: 
One of the rights of every man of sound mind is to enter into 
the marriage relation. Such is one of his civil rights, and 
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deprivation or suspension of any civil right for past conduct is 
punishment for such conduct, and this fulfills the definition of a 
bill of attainder, because a bill of attainder is a legislative act 
which inflicts punishment without a jury trial.128 
In one breath, the court implied that every person has a right to have 
children (through marital relations) and, at the same time, stated that 
the reason for the sterilization statute’s invalidity is the lack of due 
process afforded by a jury trial. The court was quick to jump from the 
idea of liberty to a procedural argument. 
Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court struck down its 
sterilization statute on grounds that inmates were not afforded due 
process.129 The hearings were held in secret and inmates had no 
opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses.130 But in 
its discussion, the court wrestled with its inclination to invalidate the 
statute on individual liberty grounds.131 
These opinions suggest that the courts wanted to make 
substantive rights arguments, but understood that procedural findings 
were easier to justify. Alternatively, these decisions could be 
explained by the absence of substantive due process rights outside of 
property and contracts and the evolving view of the courts on 
individual rights within this realm.132 
II.  THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR STERILIZATION 
The era of judicial skepticism drew to a close in the wake of the 
popular literature on eugenics, the legislation sweeping the country, 
and law review commentary. The Michigan Supreme Court and 
Supreme Court of Virginia both upheld sterilization statutes on 
substantive due process grounds.133 The relevant law reviews in these 
two states recommended and endorsed the rationale of those 
decisions, followed by legal scholars across the country.134 And finally, 
the United States Supreme Court officially held that a state’s 
involuntary sterilization program, if effectuated pursuant to some 
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kind of set process, was not a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.135 
A. State Courts Establish a New Framework for Analyzing 
Sterilization 
The first major robust defense of eugenics legislation by a state 
court came from the Michigan Supreme Court in 1925 in Smith v. 
Command.136 The court moved systematically through each of the 
legal challenges to sterilization: reasonable use of the police power,137 
cruel and unusual punishment,138 equal protection,139 and procedural 
due process.140 
The thrust of the holding in Smith was that the sterilization law 
fell within the ambit of Michigan’s police power because controlling 
feeble-mindedness was in the public interest.141 The court started by 
setting out two issues as conclusive facts: first, feeble-mindedness is 
hereditary, making sterilization an unquestionably effective means of 
decreasing the defect within the population;142 and second, feeble-
minded people are indisputably “a serious menace to society,” 
because eight times as many lived in Michigan as could be 
institutionalized.143 These assertions disregarded any scientific 
distinctions that could be made between different types of mental 
disorders and assumed that institutionalization was the only option 
for dealing with people suffering from mental disorders.144 
Under this framework, the Michigan Supreme Court evaluated 
the right to beget children against the public’s interest in preventing 
the procreation of feeble-minded individuals. The court recognized 
that “[i]t is true that the right to beget children is a natural and 
constitutional right.”145 However, the court quickly qualified this 
natural right: “Measured by its injurious effect upon society, what 
right has any citizen or class of citizens to beget children with an 
inherited tendency to crime, feeble-mindedness, idiocy, or 
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imbecility?”146 In sum, it is reasonable for the legislature to remove 
the ability of these people to procreate because they have no right to 
have children who will certainly have mental defects and thereby 
impose a burden on the state.147 By qualifying the right to beget 
children, the court was able to quell the lingering questions raised by 
other courts. 
The majority next turned to the cruel and unusual punishment 
issue. The court determined that sterilization was analogous to 
vaccination, and thus not punitive.148 Part of the rationale for this 
conclusion was that the operations were not particularly painful to the 
patients, and thus, “the results are beneficial both to the subject and 
to society.”149 Recognizing that other courts had disagreed with this 
position, the majority took careful steps to distinguish the Michigan 
law from those in other states. The majority noted this law was unlike 
the laws at issue in Davis v. Berry and State v. Feilen,150 because in 
those cases the law only imposed sterilization on convicted felons, not 
people who were institutionalized only for feeble-mindedness.151 
The majority also addressed whether the sterilization statute 
violated the equal protection clause on grounds that it did not apply 
to all mental defectives.152 The statute defined the class of people who 
would be affected by sterilization as follows: 
(a) That the said defective manifests sexual inclinations which 
make it probable that he will procreate children unless he be 
closely confined, or be rendered incapable of procreation; (b) 
That children procreated by said adjudged defective will have 
an inherited tendency to mental defectiveness; and (c) That 
there is no probability that the condition of said person will 
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improve so that his or her children will not have the inherited 
tendency aforesaid	.	.	.	.153 
This classification is actually narrower than if the statute had enforced 
sterilization on all mental defectives. Thus, it ensures that there is a 
reason for conducting the sterilization, because the sterilized person’s 
children would also need to be institutionalized for being mentally 
defective.154 Again, the court analogized the statute to existing public 
health regulations, finding that it was reasonable for the legislature to 
apply the statute to people most likely to pass on mental defects, just 
as the legislature was justified in requiring vaccinations of people 
most likely to be afflicted with smallpox.155 In both this argument and 
the cruel and unusual punishment argument, the court depicted 
mental deficiencies as purely medical problems, thereby facilitating 
justification of a “medical” remedy through sterilization.156 Again, the 
court shifted the analysis away from a discussion of fundamental 
liberty and into one about “procedure,” this time a medical 
procedure. 
The court’s equal protection analysis did conclude that a second 
section of the statute was invalid due to its application to mentally 
defective people unable to care for their children without any finding 
that the children themselves would be mentally defective.157 The court 
took issue with the notion that only poor feeble-minded people would 
be subject to this part of the statute; if they were financially able to 
support any potential children, then they would not be sterilized. In 
that sense, the court observed that the law “carves a class out of the 
class,” making poor feeble-minded people subject to different laws 
than wealthier feeble-minded people.158 This objection to the law is 
particularly noteworthy for North Carolina’s history, where 
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preventing the procreation of poor people became a major 
justification for the expansion of the eugenics program in later 
years.159 
The court held that the statute’s procedure for identifying people 
to be sterilized did not violate due process.160 The procedure required 
service of process upon the person to be sterilized and his or her 
relatives (and if no relatives could be found, upon a guardian ad 
litem).161 In addition, the statute provided several opportunities for 
the person facing sterilization to contest the procedure at a hearing or 
a jury trial, upon request, and then on appeal.162 Furthermore, unlike 
other states where the determination was relegated to a board or 
administrative agency, all sterilization proceedings occurred in the 
courts with the added support of a panel of three physicians.163 
The Smith court emphasized the importance of deference to the 
legislature, recognizing that while sterilization infringes upon a civil 
liberty, “our race” faces enormous challenges in sustaining itself: 
The Michigan statute is not perfect. Undoubtedly time and 
experience will bring changes in many of its workable features. 
But it is expressive of a state policy apparently based on the 
growing belief that, due to the alarming increase in the number 
of degenerates, criminals, feeble-minded, and insane, our race is 
facing the greatest peril of all time. Whether this belief is well 
founded is not for this court to say. Unless for the soundest 
constitutional reasons, it is our duty to sustain the policy which 
the state has adopted. As we before have said, it is no valid 
objection that it imposes reasonable restraints upon natural and 
constitutional rights. It is an historic fact that every forward step 
in the progress of the race is marked by an interference with 
individual liberties.164 
The use of the term “our race” is critical here. The Smith court 
initially justified its conclusion by focusing on the imposition of the 
costs of institutionalization on the public, which in many ways differs 
from the perils of “our race.”165 In their view, the public interest 
includes not only plain costs, but also the quality of the human race. 
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The economic argument that justified sterilization of the mentally 
disabled aligned naturally with the notion of racial purity that was 
starting to take a cultural hold. 
Three dissenting justices vigorously objected to the statute on the 
grounds that it violated a unique provision of the Michigan 
Constitution, requiring that “[i]nstitutions for the benefit of those 
inhabitants who are deaf, dumb, blind, feebleminded or insane shall 
always be fostered and supported.”166 Since the statute only applied to 
those who were segregated with the purpose of releasing them from 
the state institutions, sterilizing these people would have removed 
their access to the institutions to which they were constitutionally 
entitled.167 Justice Howard Wiest, who authored the dissent, thought 
sterilization was a relic of the ancient world; after discussing 
sterilization in Rome, which had been justified on the costs it saved, 
he concluded that “[t]his inhuman law was evidently deemed 
eugenistically essential to the welfare of the Roman Republic. It was 
eugenics in its infancy, bent on the survival of the fittest.”168 
The heart of Justice Wiest’s dissent though was that sterilization 
violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause. He focused his 
discussion not on case law, but on how barbaric the practice of 
sterilization is, equivalent to savagery and castration, and how it was 
rejected by the authors of the Michigan Constitution.169 Justice Wiest 
noted that the cruel and unusual punishment clause “struck at the evil 
evidenced in man’s inhumanity in the past, and placed a bar at any 
renewal thereof, whether in the name of science or penology, 
eugenics or human procreation regulation by mutilation.”170 
Accordingly, the protections under this clause extend to “all new 
forms of cruelty, good or bad intentioned, and all old forms disguised 
under new scientific names and theories, and pressed with the zeal 
and intolerance of converts obsessed with the fallible wisdom of 
questionable opinions.”171 
The dissent emphasized that the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause is a limitation on the police power applicable to all citizens, not 
just criminals.172 The dissent also contested the scientific conclusions 
adopted by the majority that feeble-mindedness would be inherited 
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by the offspring of a feeble-minded person, relying on a variety of 
scientific studies disputing this finding.173 This argument was an 
ardent defense of the right to bodily integrity inherent to all citizens. 
Though the jurisprudence of individual rights had not yet developed, 
Justice Wiest referred obliquely to the “inherent right of bodily 
integrity” in addition to the cruel and unusual punishment clause.174 
Wholly absent from the dissent’s discussion, however, was the 
question of the public welfare and the dollars and cents required to 
provide for the general public. The majority’s analysis in Smith was a 
calculus that weighed the overall cost to the individual against the 
benefits to society: 
It is known by conservative estimate that there are at least 
20,000 recognized feeble-minded persons in the State of 
Michigan—eight times as many as can be segregated in State 
institutions. The Michigan Home and Training School at 
Lapeer is full to overflowing with these unfortunates, and 
hundreds of others are on the waiting lists. That they are a 
serious menace to society no one will question. 
In view of these facts, what are the legal rights of this class of 
citizens as to the procreation of children? It is true that the right 
to beget children is a natural and constitutional right, but it is 
equally true that no citizen has any rights superior to the 
common welfare. Acting for the public good, the state, in the 
exercise of its police powers, may always impose reasonable 
restrictions upon the natural and constitutional rights of its 
citizens. Measured by its injurious effect upon society, what 
right has any citizen or class of citizens to beget children with an 
inherited tendency to crime, feeble-mindedness, idiocy or 
imbecility?175 
In short, the court labeled the purity of the human race a “benefit” 
and the offspring of mentally defective people a “cost.” The 
majority’s transition from discussions of substantive rights to a cost-
benefit analysis established language that courts could use to analyze 
sterilization. That framework concentrated on economics as opposed 
to the more nebulous discussion of human liberties that the Smith 
dissent used.176 
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The next state to uphold a sterilization statute was Virginia. The 
Supreme Court of Virginia’s 1925 decision in Buck v. Bell177 involved 
a Virginia law authorizing sterilization of the feeble-minded, among 
others.178 The court held that since the statute required an adequate 
notice, a hearing, and a right to appeal, it did not violate due 
process.179 Additionally, the court held that the law was not penal and 
therefore was not cruel and unusual punishment.180 The court also 
upheld the statute as a valid use of police power.181 Finally, in 
examining the equal protection clause, the court determined that 
there was no class distinction since the institutions were open to all 
feeble-minded for commitment.182 
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided Buck v. Bell on 
November 12, 1925, several months after Michigan’s Smith v. 
Command.183 The Virginia opinion in Buck disclosed none of the 
qualms of the dissenters in Smith; however, it also did not have the 
expansive justification seen in Smith. Buck had neither the intra-court 
conflict associated with Smith, nor could it be characterized as 
providing broad judicial support for sterilization, as was Smith. In 
fact, the Virginia court gave great deference to the legislature, 
drawing on a well-established judicial deference to legislatures.184 
In addition, while the Buck court found that sterilization would 
benefit the state, the court also reasoned that it would benefit Carrie 
Buck herself.185 Carrie Buck was seventeen years old, the daughter of 
a “feeble-minded” mother and the mother of an illegitimate, “feeble-
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minded” child.186 The court reasoned that, if not sterilized, Carrie 
Buck would be institutionalized until she was unable to conceive 
(sterilization “by nature”), but with the help of Virginia’s sterilization 
program, she would be permitted to leave institutional care earlier in 
her life.187 Not surprisingly, the general welfare was the justification 
for involuntarily institutionalizing Carrie Buck in the first place.188 
Following the decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Buck 
case then proceeded to the United States Supreme Court, where state 
sterilization programs would receive official judicial approval as a 
valid exercise of the police power.189 
B. The Legal Community’s Contributions to, and Acceptance of, the 
New Framework 
Prior to the decisions in both Smith and Buck, Aubrey Strode, a 
young lawyer in Lynchburg, Virginia who would soon become the 
lawyer for the state in Buck v. Bell, published a short examination 
and defense of the Virginia statute, “Sterilization for Defectives,” in 
the Virginia Law Review in 1924.190 Strode took up the question of 
whether the state’s police power was broad enough to encompass 
sterilization.191 Strode reframed the issue in terms of protecting the 
people sterilized from procreation.192 He noted that it was clear that 
the state could institutionalize people and thereby prevent them from 
having children.193 But, he questioned whether the state could take on 
a more active role: 
Is this the sole remedy available to organized society? Must 
such persons languish for life in custody and must the 
government bear the perpetual burden of thus maintaining 
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them if it would protect itself against the multiplication of their 
kind, and must this be so even when through a simple surgical 
operation not appreciably dangerous and involving the removal 
of no sound organs from the body such persons might be 
discharged from custody and become self supporting to the 
great advantage both of themselves and of society?194 
Strode posited whether “one liberty” may be “thus restored through 
the deprivation of another liberty?”195 Taking a moderate approach, 
Strode emphasized that the Virginia statute was based on eugenic 
principles, but that it only allowed sterilization when there was a 
judicial determination that “the welfare of the inmate also will be 
promoted thereby.”196 He subsequently acknowledged, “[t]he field 
here is a broad one involving what were formerly at least regarded as 
elemental personal rights.”197 Strode’s article appeared as he was 
bringing the Buck case as a test of the statute’s constitutionality 
through the Virginia courts,198 building on other law review articles as 
well as the popular and academic literature on sterilization.199 
The legal community chose to follow the majority opinion in 
Smith v. Command, not the lengthy, passionate dissent. University of 
Michigan Law Professor Burke Shartel’s article “Sterilization of 
Mental Defectives,” appeared in the Michigan Law Review in 1925 in 
defense, and one might also say, in celebration of Smith.200 In his 
article, Shartel provided not only an explanation of the Michigan law 
for sterilization, but also a defense of Smith.201 He focused on the 
Michigan legislature’s finding of “facts” regarding the effects of 
sterilization, arguing that “the court ought to require the facts on the 
basis of which the constitutionality of a law is assailed to be 
established by the assailant ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’	”202 Shartel’s 
position that courts should be barred from wading into issues of 
“fact” contrasts with the more moderate position taken by Strode in 
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the Virginia Law Review that a sterilization statute should be upheld 
if found to be a “reasonable exercise” of police power.203 Under 
Shartel’s theory, the cost-benefit analysis employed by legislatures 
could not be subject to judicial intervention and courts could only 
overturn a statute if the plaintiff demonstrated that the findings of the 
legislature were wrong “beyond a reasonable doubt.”204 
Shartel, like many other writers in the 1920s, saw a cost-benefit 
analysis as an essential part of sustaining a forced sterilization statute. 
He minimized the problem—for instance, at one point he wrote that 
though there were 20,000 “feeble-minded” persons in the state, “[t]his 
would not be too many to sterilize, considering the population as a 
whole	.	.	.	.”205 Then, following the lead of the Michigan Supreme 
Court, Shartel suggested that the issue involved calculating society’s 
need: 
If the social need be great enough the state can deprive of 
liberty (as it does do with the insane, the criminal, the man who 
objects to vaccination and so on) or it may take life (as it does 
as a penalty for crime or by drafting into the military service 
and exposing to death, etc.).206 
This cost-benefit analysis allowed little room for humanity. However, 
this cold calculus served as one of the primary justifications for the 
approval of state-sponsored sterilization in the Supreme Court. 
C. The United States Supreme Court Approves Sterilization 
In Buck, the United States Supreme Court leveraged Smith’s 
methodological calculus when it decided that sterilization programs 
violated neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.207 The Court hardly 
considered the fact that the Virginia law applied differently to people 
who were institutionalized, stating “the law does all that is needed 
when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within 
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the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so 
far and so fast as its means allow.”208 
On the question of due process, the Court nodded to the notion 
that a government action could comply with procedural due process 
and yet still violate an individual’s substantive rights: “The attack is 
not upon the procedure but upon the substantive law. It seems to be 
contended that in no circumstances could such an order be 
justified.”209 However, Justice Holmes quickly disposed of such a 
notion, finding that if the grounds for conducting a sterilization exist, 
then “they justify the result.”210 In contrast to the Supreme Court of 
Virginia, which had leaned on deference to the legislature in its 
reasoning, the United States Supreme Court declared outright the 
importance of the State’s interests over those of the individual.211 
Justice Holmes emphasized that the rights of an individual to 
procreate must be subordinated to the concerns of the State, 
juxtaposing the “lesser sacrifice” of not being able to have children 
with the all-consuming sacrifice of giving one’s life through the 
military draft.212 He pointed out that, 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it 
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the 
State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by 
those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with 
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting 
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve 
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are 
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that 
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover 
cutting the Fallopian tubes.213 
This opinion propelled the cost-benefit analysis to new heights. 
Instead of weighing the benefits to society of being free from feeble-
minded offspring against the cost of depriving a person of the right to 
procreate, the Supreme Court weighed the benefits of protecting 
national security against the costs of life. Recasting eugenics in this 
patriotic, military context, the cost seemed small and the benefits 
quite large. And so, the Supreme Court, after dismissing concerns 
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raised in the earlier part of the twentieth century,214 ultimately 
embraced eugenics as valid, even socially beneficial, government 
action. Following the lead of the Court in Buck v. Bell, the state 
courts would soon follow suit. 
III.  THE JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF STERILIZATION, 1927–1930S 
In the wake of Buck v. Bell, state legislatures and courts took 
their cue from the Supreme Court and began upholding sterilization 
legislation more routinely. An American Law Reports article on 
sterilization observed the central importance of the case: “Since the 
decision of Buck v. Bell	.	.	.	upholding the Virginia statute involved in 
that case	.	.	.	judicial opinion has inclined in favor of the 
constitutionality of such statutes, which, up to the time	.	.	.	had more 
frequently been declared unconstitutional than upheld.”215 However, 
sterilization legislation was still subject to certain procedural 
limitations. For instance, the 1927 North Carolina sterilization 
legislation, which had no provision for hearings, was struck down in 
1933 in Brewer v. Valk.216 Meanwhile, other courts upheld statutes 
similar to Virginia’s in Buck.217 
This tension between Buck’s insistence that sterilization violated 
no substantive rights and the concerns for process appear throughout 
the case law of the post-Buck era. After Buck, sterilization in and of 
itself was not considered a federal constitutional violation, but 
challenges to sterilization laws in state courts continued 
nonetheless.218 While Buck minimized an individual’s liberty interest 
in having children by contrasting it with national security interests, 
state courts diminished this liberty interest even further. Likewise, 
Buck’s statement that sterilization laws are “not penal” meant that 
courts consistently construed these statutes, even when they applied 
only to convicted criminals, as wholly separate from the criminal 
system—and accordingly, separate from the Constitution’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment.219 On the other hand, state courts that 
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may have been uncomfortable following the liberty argument of Buck 
protected individuals by requiring more process.220 
A. Expansion of Buck in Substantive Terms 
Buck eliminated the equal protection argument as a rationale for 
striking state sterilization laws, facilitating the blanket approval of 
sterilization programs at the state level. The first place where the 
power of the Buck decision became patently apparent was in Kansas. 
In State v. Schaffer,221 the State asked the court to compel a surgeon at 
Topeka State Hospital to perform sterilizations required by state 
law.222 Unlike most cases where a prisoner contested his own 
sterilization, this case was about a doctor exercising his right not to 
perform a surgery with which he had a moral disagreement.223 This 
distinction suggests that dissent existed in the medical community. 
Relying on Buck’s assertion that sterilization was a matter of 
public health, the Schaffer court framed the issue of individual liberty 
not as it related to the state’s police power, but as the state’s choice 
between promoting reproduction and promoting survival: 
Reducing this problem of reconciliation of personal liberty and 
governmental restraint to its lowest biological terms, the two 
functions indispensable to the continued existence of human 
life are nutrition and reproduction. Without nutrition, the 
individual dies; without reproduction, the race dies. Procreation 
of defective and feeble-minded children with criminal 
tendencies does not advantage, but patently disadvantages, the 
race. Reproduction turns adversary and thwarts the ultimate 
end and purpose of reproduction. The race may insure its own 
perpetuation and such progeny may be prevented in the 
interest of the higher general welfare.224 
For the Kansas Supreme Court, the question was not about the extent 
to which the state can infringe on an individual’s liberty. The question 
was about the state’s own balancing decisions and the “health” of the 
race as a whole, removing the individual’s liberty interest from the 
discussion. 
Thus, by the time the Idaho Supreme Court was deciding the 
constitutionality of sterilization three years later, the equal protection 
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question had become almost routine. In State v. Troutman,225 the 
Idaho Supreme Court quickly eliminated each constitutional 
objection to the state sterilization statute.226 The Troutman court 
noted that an individual liberty interest may not even exist for the 
feeble-minded.227 And similarly, in In re Main,228 the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma simply noted that Oklahoma’s law was substantively 
identical to the Virginia law in Buck, and that the interest of the 
public good overcame any liberty interest an individual might have.229 
In sum, in the ten years following Buck, state courts expanded upon 
the notion that legislation could treat institutionalized and non-
institutionalized citizens differently to encompass the idea that 
institutionalized people may not even have a right to reproduction in 
the first place. 
Despite the fact that Buck’s holding upheld sterilization on equal 
protection and due process grounds, its language also led state courts 
to reject arguments that sterilization constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.230 For instance, in 1931 the Nebraska Supreme Court 
used this precedent to dismiss a cruel and unusual punishment 
argument.231 The court explained that a vasectomy was a relatively 
minor operation because it is a relatively short procedure that is not 
dangerous to the individual’s health and does not remove the 
individual’s sexual desire or ability to engage in sexual activity.232 
Coupling Buck’s finding that sterilization is inherently not penal with 
the simplicity of the operation, the Nebraska court was able to avoid 
the cruel and unusual punishment argument altogether. Once the 
gentleness of the operation had been cast in this light, the Nebraska 
court could avoid questions about the infringement of individual 
liberty and easily liken the operation to immunizations.233 
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Ten years later (and fifteen years after Buck), the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma used a similar logic to justify upholding the state’s 
sterilization statute in Skinner.234 In Oklahoma, the sterilization law at 
issue only applied to convicted criminals, making the contention that 
the law was not “penal” more problematic. The Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma recognized that it had a choice: construe the statute as 
penal, and therefore unconstitutional, or construe the statute as the 
promotion of public health akin to vaccinations, and therefore 
valid.235 The court decided to “assume” the legislative intent was to 
prevent procreation of people who would then become criminals in 
order to avoid invalidating the law.236 It was Buck that gave courts the 
ability to circumvent the difficult issues raised by forcibly removing 
an individual’s ability to have children. 
B. Imposing Procedure on Eugenics Programs 
The first state to take a stand against sterilization laws on 
procedural grounds was Utah in 1929. In Davis v. Walton,237 the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the state failed to show that Davis was “the 
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise 
afflicted,” as required by law.238 A prison guard alleged he had caught 
the inmate committing sodomy with another inmate, although the 
other inmate denied this allegation.239 On its face, the finding is simply 
an application of basic principles—the State did not prove the 
elements required for the sterilization statute to attach. But the court 
stepped further in criticizing the State. The court noted that the 
operation would not help the inmate overcome his “abnormal sexual 
desire.”240 Furthermore, the sterilization order did not specify which 
of the three operation types was ordered (vasectomy, cutting the 
nerves, or castration), and so the cruelty of the act could not be 
assessed.241 The Utah court critiqued the practice of sterilization by 
discussing the potential cruelty of the operation itself and the 
retributive nature of the State’s decision to sterilize a homosexual, 
who had no chance of procreating with another man anyway.242 
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In 1935, the Supreme Court of Alabama also found procedural 
problems with its state sterilization statute.243 In contrast to other 
cases, this case was a certified question from the governor, implying 
that the Governor took issue with the legislative enactment in the first 
place, and thereby making the court’s position politically easier.244 
The court first distinguished the Alabama law from the Virginia law 
upheld in Buck by pointing out that the Alabama legislation denied a 
right to appeal de novo in a court.245 The Supreme Court of Alabama 
then set out several procedural problems with the legislation related 
to the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard.246 In making its 
procedural due process argument, the court articulated why process 
was so important, thereby hinting at the substantive issue: 
We think that the sterilization of a person is such an injury to 
the person as is contemplated by the quoted provision—just as 
much so as to deprive him of any other faculty, sense, or limb—
and that due process of law means that this cannot be done 
without a hearing on notice before a duly constituted tribunal 
or board, and, if this is not a court, then with the untrammeled 
right of appeal to a court for a judicial review from the finding 
of the board or commission adjudging him a fit subject for 
sterilization.247 
Even with this articulation of the importance of the right to have 
children, the Supreme Court of Alabama provided guidance to the 
legislature for creating a valid sterilization statute. Sterilization is an 
appropriate use of the police power so long as (1) status 
determination is constitutionally ascertained, and (2) the procedure is 
not cruel and unusual punishment.248 
And then, over fifteen years after Buck, the Washington 
Supreme Court in In re Hendrickson,249 struck down another 
sterilization statute on procedural grounds in 1942, only months 
before the Supreme Court struck down Oklahoma’s sterilization law 
in Skinner.250 The Washington court challenged the way the state 
provided notice to confined people facing sterilization.251 The law 
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required that the state simply give notice to the feeble-minded 
person, which the court contested because by definition that person 
would not likely understand the procedure against him.252 The law 
provided notice to the insane differently than the feeble-minded: the 
state was to provide notice to the guardian, or the next of kin, but if 
neither of those existed, to the superintendent of the facility.253 The 
court took issue with this latter provision as well, because the 
superintendent of the facility was the same person who would be 
recommending the sterilization.254 
The Hendrickson court’s desire to strike down the sterilization 
statute was apparent, because neither of these procedural provisions 
applied to Hendrickson himself, since notice was provided to 
Hendrickson’s next of kin—in this case, his father.255 The Washington 
court twisted itself around to strike down the whole of the statute, 
holding that because the law was primarily designed to limit 
procreation by the feeble-minded, the provisions applying to the 
insane like Hendrickson would not have been enacted without the 
unconstitutional provision for the feeble-minded.256 As the dissent 
pointed out, the court’s reasoning is somewhat unjustified because if 
the legislature had known that parts of the law inapplicable to a 
person at bar were unconstitutional, those portions would have been 
omitted in the first place.257 
In sum, process became the framework through which courts 
could discuss the importance of the right infringed upon by 
sterilization laws. Courts used these procedural constraints to keep 
the eugenics movement in check in some states. But this reliance on 
process to invalidate eugenics laws led to an increase in process—
increased procedure resulted in a mechanized, normalized process for 
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sterilizing people. The North Carolina experience exemplifies how 
the judicial focus on heightened procedure worked to embed a 
routinized eugenics program in the state, with little room for victims 
to question what was happening to them.258 Despite the 
mechanization of the sterilization process, courts at least attempted to 
protect the rights of plaintiffs by heightening procedural 
requirements. In other areas of the legal profession, especially with 
some practicing lawyers and academics, questions about the legality 
and morality of sterilization emerged. The law was on the side of 
sterilization, but rumbles of dissent were growing. 
IV.  THE REJECTION OF STERILIZATION, 1930S–1942 
A. Gauging Lawyers’ Attitudes Towards Eugenics in the 1930s 
There were other voices calling for reason, too. Clarence Ruddy, 
a member of the class of 1927 at Notre Dame Law School and the 
first editor-in-chief of the Notre Dame Lawyer (what became the 
Notre Dame Law Review)259 provided probably the strongest case 
against sterilization in a law review during the entire decade of the 
1920s.260 Ruddy framed the issue of sterilization as one of many 
infringements on individual freedom and constitutional rights and 
stated that “[t]he most dramatic means so far adopted for the 
extinction of the individual is sterilization.”261 He based his case 
against sterilization largely on religious doctrine that taught the 
dignity of humans and the limitations that the state could impose on 
religion.262 It was a passionate plea, but one that was not heeded. A 
year earlier, a young, radical lawyer from New York City, Jacob 
Broches Aronoff, wrote in the St. John’s Law Review about the 
reasons for public opposition to eugenics legislation.263 Born in 1896 
in Russia, Aronoff was a 1918 graduate of Columbia College, where 
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he was a member of the Intercollegiate Socialist Club, and a 1923 
graduate of Fordham University School of Law.264 In the early 1930s, 
Aronoff supported union workers with several articles in the popular 
press,265 in addition to his work as a lawyer.266 From his standpoint, 
the system “look[ed] like a heartless method on the part of the tax-
paying classes of getting rid of a duty of caring for the helpless and 
unfortunate of the poorer strata of society	.	.	.	.”267 Despite those 
vigorous protests against sterilization, the tendency was going in the 
other direction. 
Perhaps one of the most pernicious aspects of Buck v. Bell was 
its legitimation of sterilization. The year 1930 saw discussion of yet 
another book endorsing eugenics based on both its potential to 
preserve and improve the white race, E.S. Gosney and Paul 
Popenoe’s Sterilization for Human Betterment.268 It discussed 
California’s supposed success with sterilization.269 Gosney and 
Popenoe’s handbook included an address by Otis H. Castle at the 
ABA’s annual meeting in 1928.270 Castle, a Los Angeles lawyer,271 was 
also a board member of the Human Betterment League272 and 
sometimes a lecturer at the University of Southern California’s 
School of Law.273 
One underutilized method of gauging the legal profession’s 
attitudes towards sterilization involves reading their literary output.274 
To that end, several prominent legal commentators lent their support 
to the eugenics movement as advanced by Gosney and Popenoe. 
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William Renwick Riddell, a judge on the Ontario, Canada, appellate 
bench and a prolific historian,275 reviewed Sterilization for Human 
Betterment in the ABA Journal in 1930.276 He invoked Buck and then 
added that “the appalling prevalence of imbecility and the consequent 
drain upon the resources of the people have impelled many to 
consider sterilization of the imbecile as called for	.	.	.	.”277 Riddell 
concluded, “other jurisdictions may well profit by the example of 
California.”278 Similarly, University of Illinois Sociology Professor 
Donald Taft’s review of Sterilization for Human Betterment in the 
Illinois Law Review concluded, “[s]terilization will eliminate many 
socially dangerous homes. If, as is quite probable, a race somewhat 
sounder eugenically also results, we can all rejoice.”279 
Even though courts routinely upheld sterilization legislation in 
the 1930s, others in the legal profession expressed reservations about 
such legislation. Law review articles in the 1930s reveal lawyers’ 
skepticism of eugenics.280 The Yale Law Journal offered a mild 
critique in its review of Gosney and Popenoe, asking for a more 
extensive review of the scientific evidence in support of 
sterilization.281 The Harvard Law Review’s even shorter review of 
Sterilization for Human Betterment concluded by noting that the 
imminence of eugenic legislation was “disturbing.”282 While these 
were not strong criticisms by any means, they demonstrated concern 
about what was coming. 
Further, some law review articles advanced an alternative vision 
with stronger skepticism towards this movement. Such skepticism 
appeared in reviews of City University of New York Professor Jacob 
Henry Landman’s 1932 book Human Sterilization.283 Landman was 
 
 275.  See William Renwick Riddell, CANADIAN ENCYLCOPEDIA, (June 13, 2016, 12:43 
AM), http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/william-renwick-riddell/ [https://
perma.cc/RS4E-2GKY]. 
 276.  William Renwick Riddell, Book Review, 16 A.B.A. J. 253, 253 (1930). 
 277.  Id. at 253. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Donald R. Taft, Book Review, 24 ILL. L. REV. 944, 947 (1930). 
 280.  See id. at 946 (reviewing authors who were skeptical of sterilization). 
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cautious about sterilization and his reviewers frequently extended his 
criticisms. For example, George S. Roche’s review in the California 
Law Review argued that Landman failed to engage fully with the 
moral qualms about sterilization.284 Roche, whose other work 
presented a sympathetic case for temporary housing for itinerant 
workers in California,285 wrote that “the author does not always 
recognize the Devil in disguise.”286 Another review of Landman that 
appeared in the Southern California Law Review, written by a law 
student, ridiculed the underlying justification for sterilization by 
drawing attention to the logical extreme of the eugenics movement: 
the outright extermination of the “unfit.”287 
Despite some important critiques of eugenics in law reviews, 
other articles supported sterilization. In addition to the early articles 
by Aubrey Stode and Burke Shartel that supported sterilization 
before Buck v. Bell, law reviews supported sterilization into the 1930s. 
During the 1934–1935 school year, the Kentucky Law Journal 
published two pieces supporting sterilization. The first was a student 
work.288 The second was an article by University of Kentucky 
Anthropology Professor and Dean of the graduate school W.D. 
Funkhouser.289 Dean Funkhouser concluded his article: 
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(1934) (noting that the best way to reduce society’s “misery resulting from insanity” is 
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Funkhouser cites 1899 as the first legal adoption of sterilization, 1899 refers to the date 
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In those states where consistent and regular use of the measure 
has been followed, since it was first legally adopted in 1899, the 
results are startling even after one generation. No new patients 
are appearing to fill the slowly decreasing ranks in the asylums 
and hospitals except those who come from other states. This 
decrease will of course be greater with each succeeding 
generation. In fact it is claimed that if sterilization laws could be 
enforced in the whole United States, less than four generations 
would eliminate nine-tenths of the feeble-mindedness, insanity 
and crime of the country.290 
Even though some lawyers and students took to the pages of law 
reviews to ridicule eugenics or make the case against it, public 
attitudes—as reflected in legislation—continued to favor sterilization. 
Sterilization legislation swept through state legislatures in the 1920s 
and 1930s.291 LeRoy Maeder’s review of Landman’s book in the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review begins with the recognition of 
the popularity of sterilization: 
The voluminous literature on human sterilization which has 
appeared in recent years has been for the most part definitely 
biased in favor of this procedure and has served to influence a 
considerable group of people to believe that in the general 
employment of this method as a compulsory eugenic measure 
will bring about a substantial reduction in the number of the 
socially inadequate, especially the feebleminded. The 
enthusiasts have succeeded so well in their propaganda that 
even sober-minded persons have urged the adoption of broad 
human sterilization legislation as a means of coping with the 
mentally disordered and deficient, and of reducing the burden 
of state appropriations to public institutions supporting them.292 
This survey of law reviews demonstrates that even as the state courts 
were falling in line behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. 
Bell, there was some opposition to eugenics in the legal community. 
That is, legal scholars at the time understood that sterilization 
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implicated significant moral problems, the economic justification for 
it being one of the most significant. However, from Buck v. Bell 
through the late 1930s, the weight of public opinion and legal 
authority remained in favor of sterilization.293 
B. Skinner v. Oklahoma: Recognizing a Fundamental Right 
Fifteen years after Buck in 1942, the Supreme Court struck down 
a sterilization law in Skinner v. Oklahoma.294 Skinner is remembered 
for its importance in the larger movement towards fundamental rights 
and the expansion of substantive due process in the 1950s and 
1960s.295 The case represents a culmination of previous efforts to 
highlight the fundamental rights of procreation and outlines a 
distinction between rational basis review and strict scrutiny.296 But 
within the context of the eugenics movement, it is important to 
remember that Skinner carved out a way for Buck v. Bell to continue 
to govern many state sterilization programs. 
The Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma sterilization statute 
violated the equal protection clause because it exempted certain 
criminal activity from compulsory sterilization.297 The Oklahoma law 
required that people who had been convicted of more than two 
felonies were to be sterilized if doing so would not injure the 
individual.298 Exempt felonies included embezzlement, but not theft. 
So, Skinner, who had stolen chickens and committed armed robbery 
twice, would be sterilized, but a person who stole funds from his 
company (essentially the same act) would not.299 In drawing this 
distinction, the court elaborated on the heightened scrutiny that the 
equal protection clause requires for laws that infringe on a 
fundamental right.300 
However, the Supreme Court specifically noted that it was not 
overturning Buck, thereby allowing many state sterilization statutes 
to remain intact after Skinner.301 Buck had a “saving feature” that 
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Skinner did not: it treated all institutionalized people the same.302 
Following sterilization under Buck, institutionalized people might be 
permitted to reside in their community.303 That is, if the legislature’s 
classification was between institutionalized and non-institutionalized 
feeble-minded people, and sterilization would allow more people to 
avoid institutionalization, then the equal protection clause was 
satisfied.304 On the other hand, the statute in Skinner treated some 
felons differently from others.305 It sterilized those convicted three 
times of grand larceny while it did not sterilize those convicted three 
times of embezzlement.306 For that reason, states could continue to 
sterilize the feeble-minded and insane without running into major 
equal protection hurdles. 
With the Supreme Court’s validation of sterilization in Buck, the 
question of whether sterilization violated fundamental rights would 
have to await the development of the substantive due process 
doctrine. The judiciary had wavered on recognizing a fundamental 
human right to have children. But as the law developed, procedural 
focus gave way to a cost-benefit calculation—one that ultimately 
subordinated these potential rights to the interests of the state. In this 
sense, the legal justification for sterilization was rooted in the interest 
of the government. 
As often is the case in American law, the march towards liberty 
was accompanied by an expansion in the value we attached to 
individuals.307 Whereas before World War II, eugenicists emphasized 
the costs to society and minimized the interests of the people who had 
children; after the war, that rhetoric was more circumscribed and an 
understanding of the value of autonomy over reproductive decisions 
ultimately emerged. However, in spite of these changing social and 
legal norms, state-sponsored sterilization programs persisted in 
several parts of the country, including North Carolina.308 Against this 
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backdrop, we now turn to an analysis of North Carolina’s experience 
with sterilization. 
V.  THE NORTH CAROLINA MINDSET 
All three branches of state government weighed in on North 
Carolina’s eugenics program. The original non-criminal sterilization 
law, which the legislature passed in 1929, was revised after the courts 
raised concerns about whether it afforded individuals adequate 
procedural protections.309 The new law, passed in 1933, did have 
procedural safeguards, which the executive branch then used to 
develop a systematic practice for identifying candidates for 
sterilization.310 Although the use of sterilization began to wane in the 
1960s, the legislature revised the law in 1974 and it faced another 
court challenge.311 Even in the wake of Roe v. Wade and the 
revolution of reproductive rights, however, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina upheld sterilization in 1976—and the legacy of this 
long-lasting state-sponsored program continues to cast a dark shadow 
over both the individuals affected and the state’s jurisprudence.312 
A. The 1929 Sterilization Law and the Court’s Procedural Objections 
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted its first 
sterilization statute in 1919, authorizing sterilizations for the health 
and well-being of prison inmates.313 In 1929, two years after Buck v. 
Bell, North Carolina passed its first sterilization statute that applied 
outside the prison context.314 The statute provided that: 
It shall be the duty of the board of commissioners of any county 
of North Carolina, at the public cost and expense, to have the 
operation performed upon any mentally defective or feeble-
minded resident of the county, not an inmate of any public 
institution, upon the petition and request of the next kin or 
legal guardian of such mentally defective person	.	.	.	.315 
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina struck down the law for lack of 
procedural due process in Brewer v. Valk, since Buck had specifically 
emphasized the importance of both notice and a hearing.316 The 
court’s holding turned explicitly on the need for notice and hearing in 
matters that involve right to be free from physical harm.317 
Despite the court’s recognition of human rights involved in 
involuntary sterilization, Brewer focused on the benefits of 
sterilization, both to society and to the individual.318 The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina took Buck one-step further by lauding the 
benefits of sterilization for the individual. Instead of focusing on the 
savings eugenics offers for the state, as Buck did, Brewer portrayed 
the state as helping a poor woman stop herself from having more 
children.319 In Brewer, the Supreme Court of North Carolina gave 
clear directions on how to fix the sterilization statute, while at the 
same time recognizing that a procedurally compliant eugenics 
program would have social benefits.320 The legislature needed only to 
provide notice and opportunity to be heard, paralleling the provisions 
of the statute in neighboring Virginia, and the revision would be 
upheld. Process, not whether or not the individual had a fundamental 
right to have children, became the focus of the legislature in 
redrafting the law and the executive branch in administering the law. 
B. The Revised 1933 Sterilization Act 
The revised 1933 North Carolina Act provided some 
additional—but not many—procedural protections for those who 
would be sterilized, grounding the justification in what it claimed was 
the best interest of the patient or the public good.321 For those who 
were institutionalized, the proceedings before the Eugenics Board 
were initiated by written petition of the “prosecutor,”322 who was 
generally the superintendent of any “penal or charitable” institution 
supported by the state.323 The petition needed to contain the medical 
history of the person to be sterilized and particular reasons why 
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sterilization was recommended.324 A physician who had actual 
knowledge of the case then verified the medical history, and a social 
history of the patient’s life was included in the petition in order to 
predict the likelihood of the patient to procreate.325 A copy of the 
petition was then served, along with written notice to the patient or 
the patient’s guardian, stating when the board would hear the 
petition.326 The Eugenics Board would then make its decision, and if it 
determined that sterilization was for “the best interest for the mental, 
moral or physical improvement of the patient” or “for the public 
good[,]” then the board was required to approve the 
recommendation.327 
1.  The 1935 Sterilization Pamphlet 
Two years after the Act’s passage, the Eugenics Board published 
a pamphlet, Eugenical Sterilizations in North Carolina, that served 
partly as a propaganda piece and partly as a how-to manual for those 
seeking to obtain the Eugenics Board’s approval for their patients.328 
The pamphlet began in the same way that Gosney and Popenoe’s 
Sterilization for Human Betterment did—by noting that in modern 
society many people who survive to reach childbearing age would 
have died in earlier generations.329 That is, sterilization was justified 
on the premise that it served the supposed purpose that nature once 
did—making sure that the unfit did not have children.330 The parallels 
of the two works reflect the intellectual colonization of North 
Carolina by Gosney and Popenoe’s arguments. 
The pamphlet quotes a Raleigh News and Observer editorial 
supporting sterilization,331 as well as the State Board of Public 
Health’s study of the “Wake family,” which discussed a married 
couple from Wake County.332 The pamphlet also provided summary 
tables on the number of people sterilized through June 1935, breaking 
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down the data into various categories, such as gender, race, age, and 
whether those sterilized were in state or county institutions or resided 
in the community.333 A table also detailed common types of illnesses 
of those who were sterilized.334 The pamphlet’s tables—which were 
periodically updated in biennial reports of the Eugenics Board—
reveal that once the Eugenics Board heard a petition, the request was 
almost always approved. From the passage of the 1933 Act until June 
1935, the Board considered 236 petitions, of which it approved 231.335 
It is unclear how many, if any, of the five rejected petitions involved 
“consent.” Of the 231 petitions approved, there was one appeal. In 
that one case, the superior court upheld the Eugenics Board’s 
decision.336 By the end of June 1935, 223 operations had been carried 
out (including several dozen that were approved under the 1929 
law).337 Of those, 155 had been for people in either state (140) or 
county institutions (15); the other 68 resided in the community.338 
The 1935 pamphlet also reprinted several forms for facilitating 
approval from the Eugenics Board. The first was a petition for 
individuals in a state or county institution.339 The petition recited that 
sterilization was in the best interest of the patient and that 
sterilization was for the public good; and that the inmate would “be 
likely, unless operated upon, to procreate a child or children who 
would have a tendency to serious physical, mental or nervous disease 
or deficiency.”340 The petition collected information on the individual, 
personal and family history, and their medical history. 341 The forms 
asked for the individual’s “record of defects.” 342 The list provided a 
number of possible “defects”, including (in this order): insanity, 
feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, convulsions, paralysis, sexual 
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promiscuity, syphilis, gonorrhea, tuberculosis, alcoholism, criminality, 
suicidal tendency, pauper, drug addict, congenital blindness, acquired 
blindness, acquired deafness, dumbness, extreme nervousness, chorea 
(sudenhams), and chorea (Huntingtons).343 Another briefer form was 
used for patients in the community,344 and another form provided for 
next of kin to consent.345 Already, two years after the passage of 
North Carolina’s sterilization law, the administrative state was well 
prepared to smooth the way to sterilization of hundreds of North 
Carolinians, mostly women, each year. 
2.  The Administration of Sterilization in North Carolina 
Two administrative manuals helped explain to state officials how 
to proceed with sterilization petitions before the Eugenics Board. The 
1948 Administrative Manual was the first one that the state 
produced.346 The manual contained a brief history of the North 
Carolina movement for sterilization, noting in particular that North 
Carolina was influenced by California’s experience.347 The 1948 
manual also provided, perhaps unsurprisingly, a roadmap to the 
sterilization process. This guidance described first who may be 
sterilized (the “feebleminded, epileptic, and mentally diseased”) and 
then described the circumstances in which those people may be 
sterilized. 348 Sterilization was possible in three instances: (1) when it is 
believed that such an operation would be for “the best interests of the 
individual concerned”; (2) “for the public good”; or (3) “when it is 
believed a child or children might be born who would have a 
tendency to serious mental or nervous disease or deficiency.”349 
The manual then identified those with responsibility and power 
to file sterilization petitions: the executive head of a penal or 
charitable organizations and the county superintendent of public 
welfare.350 The manual also provided instructions regarding the forms 
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to use.351 The forms differed based on whether the person to be 
sterilized was institutionalized or resident in the community.352 The 
manual instructed that the petition for sterilization should provide 
information regarding the “likelihood of the person to procreate a 
child or children who would have a tendency to serious physical, 
mental, or nervous disease or deficiency, and	.	.	.	[t]he reasons why it 
is considered to be for the public good that the individual have the 
operation.”353 
Perhaps tellingly, the manual’s instructions do not ask for specific 
evidence of why sterilization was in the best interest of the individual, 
even though the sterilization statute provided that the best interest of 
the individual was one reason that could support a sterilization.354 
This omission suggests that the emphasis of the Eugenics Board was 
shifting to procreation and to public good, signaling that the board 
was no longer so focused on the supposed benefits to the individual to 
be sterilized. 
Finally, the manual turned to the critical issue of consent, 
explaining that the Eugenics Board was more likely to approve a 
procedure if either the individual or an authorized family member 
consented.355 It provided a form for individuals who were competent 
to consent (at least twenty-one years of age, not confined in one of 
the four state mental hospitals, nor mentally unsound).356 Others 
needed the consent of a spouse, parent, next of kin, or guardian.357 If 
the person to be sterilized was married, then the spouse’s consent was 
recommended.358 If the spouse could not be located, then the next of 
kin could suffice.359 If the person to be sterilized was a minor, consent 
of a parent—preferably the father—was needed, or a guardian ad 
litem if there was no parent.360 In those cases where consent had not 
been obtained, the Eugenics Board was required to hold a hearing “in 
which reasons for and against the operation [were] heard.”361 
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The 1948 manual’s outline of procedures, particularly around 
consent, leads naturally to several questions concerning the procedure 
for securing “consent.” Maybe the most important is how did state 
actors secure consent? What proportion of petitions had consent? 
How often did the board reject petitions where there was consent? 
What evidence did the board require where there was no consent? In 
what proportion of contested cases did they reject contested 
petitions? And what can we discover about the nature of the board’s 
deliberations? In short, how did the board operate? These 
foundational questions regarding the meaning of “consent” and how 
the state behaved when it was depriving its citizens of the right to 
procreation are difficult to answer given the limited and aggregate 
data that the Eugenics Board released.362 The data does not indicate 
how the practices varied depending on the race, gender, and age of 
the sterilization targets.363 
We desperately need a better picture of how the process worked 
from the view of petitioners—the hospitals and the county 
superintendents of public welfare. That picture should address how 
the petitioners selected people to suggest for sterilization. We need to 
know much more as well about the mysterious process by which 
individuals and their families were convinced to agree to sterilization. 
Finally, we need to know more about how the state reacted in the 
instances in which the individuals and families would not agree to 
sterilization. 
Moya Woodside’s 1950 book, Sterilization in North Carolina: A 
Sociological and Psychological Study, alludes to the mechanics of this 
coercive process.364 In spite of being published well after sterilization 
was on the decline, her book represented an attempt to sustain the 
eugenics movement. The epigram for the book, for instance, was 
taken from famed North Carolina political scientist Howard Odum: 
“In the modern world of technology the folkways are supplanted 
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largely by the technicways. If change can be brought about, it can best 
be done by understanding the folkways and substituting the 
technicways for them.”365 That is, Woodside seems to support a 
substitution of the “folkways” of all citizens having children for the 
“technicways” of eugenics. 
Yet, Woodside realized the challenges sterilization faced and 
thus included a chapter that addressed “[d]ifficulties [i]mpeding 
[w]ider [a]cceptance.”366 This inclusion was a final call in defense of 
eugenics, about a decade after sterilization had been rejected 
elsewhere in the United States and as others were regularly rejecting 
sterilization. She provides a picture of how the process worked in 
practice, in conjunction with North Carolina’s code. 
The sterilization process in North Carolina began with a petition 
from the head of an institution or a county welfare official or a 
petition from a family member attesting that sterilization was in the 
best interest of society.367 If there was consent from the individual or a 
family member, then authorization by the board seemed to be easy. 
In most instances, apparently, there was consent by either the 
individual or a family member. Woodside reported that all but ten of 
the 276 petitions filed with the Eugenics Board between 1944 and 
1946 included consent forms.368 In fact, many of the people involved 
in the process complained about the procedural hurdles to 
sterilization. That is, health officials at the center of petitioning the 
Eugenics Board found the procedures burdensome and difficult to 
meet unless there was consent by the individual or a family 
member.369 
These statements leave significant questions about what process 
was used to obtain consent from individuals or family members. 
Woodside gives some sense of how consent was obtained by 
discussing what she called “education.”370 However, her examples 
reveal that there was often substantial opposition to sterilization by 
family members.371 What remains unknown are the number of people 
sterilized with consent of a family member and the number sterilized 
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with their own consent. Most importantly, it still remains unknown 
what “consent” means or how it was obtained. Answers to these 
questions would tell us a great deal about the course of sterilization in 
North Carolina. We can infer that “consent” was coerced in many 
cases.372 However, the leading historian in this area has estimated that 
twenty percent of the consensual sterilizations were voluntarily 
sought by patients as part of a normal family planning process.373 
One other gauge of the Eugenics Board’s interpretation of 
“consent” comes from the administrative manuals they produced.374 
As already noted, the 1948 manual provided forms and advice to state 
officials who prepared petitions to sterilize individuals. 375 Even as late 
as 1948, the manual presented a positive case for sterilization.376 For 
instance, the manual stated that sterilization “permits patients, who 
would otherwise be confined to institutions during the fertile period 
of life, to return to their homes and friends.”377 The 1960 manual 
backed off the 1948 manual’s statements about positive aspects of 
eugenics, instead acknowledging that the effects of sterilization are 
“physical as well as emotional and that there will be both positive and 
negative factors to consider.”378 This later manual presented 
sterilization as “part of a broad system of protection and supervision 
of those individuals unable to meet their responsibilities as parents 
and citizens.”379 And the 1960 manual emphasized the participation of 
those who were sterilized and their families, as well as health care 
providers.380 In essence, the 1960 manual established a more nuanced 
and co-operative vision for sterilization. 
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This change in language invites several interpretations. In some 
ways, it shifted the focus to the people sterilized and away from the 
benefits of sterilization for the state. On the other hand, the language 
of the 1960 manual made a gross violation of personal autonomy 
seem like something in the best interest of the person sterilized. The 
later manual framed the issue from the perspective of the person to 
be sterilized. “The law” provides, the manual noted, “for the 
sterilization of individuals	.	.	.	when such individuals are found to be in 
need of the protection of sterilization from the standpoint of their 
social, emotional, mental and physical development and related 
environmental factors.”381 By 1960, the focus of the state’s regulation 
of procreation had shifted from the good of the state to the supposed 
good of the patient. 
The 1960 manual also provided more guidance than the 1948 
manual on the meaning of “consent.” Among other things, the 
revised manual mandated that the individual’s “spouse, parents, 
and/or next of kin have participated in the casework plan leading to 
the decision for sterilization.”382 And, along with this new focus, it 
added a new form to provide more guidance on a person’s “social 
history” to “giv[e] an explanation as to why sterilization seems to be 
indicated.”383 
The changes within the revised manual correlated with changing 
numbers of people sterilized, too. The next Section turns to the data 
provided in the biennial reports of the Eugenics Board to trace out 
the nature of changes in sterilization, from the gender, race, and age 
of those sterilized to the changes in the proportion of people in 
institutional settings who were sterilized. By analyzing the aggregate 
data released by the Eugenics Board from the 1930s to the 1960s, this 
Article endeavors to provide broad answers to the questions about 
consent in the operation of North Carolina’s eugenics regime. 
3.  North Carolina’s Data: “Compulsion and Consent”384 
The role of consent is central to understanding the nature and 
scope of North Carolina’s sterilization program, but many important 
questions remain unanswered. There are some summary figures, 
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however, from which some inferences can be drawn. The Eugenics 
Board’s 1966 annual report set forth historical figures on the number 
of people sterilized each year from 1929 through 1966.385 The data is 
broken down between patients who were institutionalized and 
patients who were based in the community, as indicated in Table 1.386 
Surprisingly, the height of sterilization in North Carolina was in the 
1950s, well after most other jurisdictions’ eugenics programs had 
begun to decline.387 In fact, the Eugenics Board seems to have been 
quite proactive in the decade after World War II ended. The 
publication of the 1948 administrative manual coincided with the 
increase in sterilizations.388 Perhaps that administrative manual, by 
making clearer the procedures to be used, was instrumental in the 
Eugenics Board’s increased effectiveness.389 
The biennial reports of the Eugenics Board reveal that only a 
small percentage of people were sterilized over the objection of their 
family members, especially after 1936.390 Table 2 lists the percentage 
of petitions received by the Eugenics Board in two-year segments 
from 1934 to 1966 for which there was no consent by the individual or 
family members.391 After the first biennial report (1934–1936), when 
the Eugenics Board was apparently still working out strategies for 
effectively finding and approving people for sterilization, the petitions 
almost always had the consent of family members.392 From 1936 to 
1954, there were never more than 6.5% of the petitions in any 
biennial period that lacked consent.393 As the 1944 biennial report 
observed, “if the case for sterilization is properly presented, the 
cooperation of the family can be secured in most instances.”394 From 
1956 onward, the biennial reports list no cases where there was no 
“consent.”395 Apparently there were very few, if any, such cases.396 
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Similarly, the 1960 biennial report noted the usual cooperation: 
“[T]he individual and husband, or wife, or close relative usually 
participate in the plan and make their own decision in favor of the 
operation before signing the consent.”397 In the few instances when 
family consent was not obtained, the Eugenics Board still seems to 
have moved forward. For instance, in the 1948–1950 period, 81% of 
the petitions filed without family consent were still approved.398 
There was at least nominal “consent” for the vast majority of 
sterilizations approved by the Eugenics Board. What remains 
unclear—and will almost surely remain unclear until there is a 
systematic study of records that are not yet open to the public—is 
how much of the purported “consent” was actually coerced. The 
biennial reports frequently reference the difficulty of obtaining 
consent from men. The 1948–1950 biennial report, for instance, 
reported, “[m]en need much interpretation to assure them that the 
operation is simple and that its only effect is the prevention of 
parenthood.”399 As shown in Table 4, the dramatic decline in the 
percentage of men who were sterilized, particularly after the mid-
1950s, may reflect the difficulty of coercing men or the relative ease of 
coercing women.400 
Moreover, the distinction between the treatment of people from 
the community as opposed to those who were institutionalized merits 
significant attention. A review of the administrative process indicates 
that those based in the community could only have been sterilized 
through consent—though here, again, what consent meant and how 
much coercion was involved in obtaining “consent” is difficult, if not 
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impossible, to determine at this point. Thus, while the number of 
institutionalized people sterilized remained in the hundreds through 
the middle of the 1950s, by the 1960s more than eighty percent of 
people sterilized resided in the community.401 
When social workers did extract consent, the Eugenics Board did 
not hold a hearing.402 The Board only conducted hearings in cases 
where neither the patient herself nor the patients’ next of kin 
consented. 403 The Eugenics Board approved the vast majority of 
petitions in the early years, but by the 1960s, was routinely rejecting 
petitions.404 For instance, while from 1934 to 1936, the Board 
authorized 301 of the 309 petitions presented, from 1964 to 1966, it 
authorized only 368 of the 461 petitions presented.405 
Some hint of just how much planning was involved on the part of 
public health officials to obtain “consent” of family members to 
sterilization appears in Moya Woodside’s book, Sterilization in North 
Carolina.406 Woodside described the ideas and practices of social 
workers as they tried to convince North Carolinians to accept 
sterilization.407 Woodside detailed the opposition that state welfare 
workers faced when encouraging sterilization.408 She noted that 
individuals undergoing sterilization procedures and their family 
members often proved quite obstinate.409 For instance, she reported 
that “[o]ne of the Negro gynecologists, accustomed to talk with 
husbands for permission to operate on their wives, said he thought an 
important factor in refusal was the pride a man had in his ability to 
make his wife pregnant.”410 Sometimes the social workers’ discussion 
of opposition to sterilization was infused with racial prejudice. For 
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instance, one welfare worker wrote that “the Negroes tend to resist 
more than the whites which may be due to ignorance and superstition 
which is more prevalent among the Negroes than the whites.”411 
Woodside herself wrote about the opposition in rural North Carolina 
more broadly, stating that “[a]mong such backward and isolated 
groups as we have described, no great response can be expected to 
proposals of a scientific nature which run counter to folkways and 
experience.”412 
Woodside’s description of petitions before the Eugenics Board 
reveals that individuals may have been subject to coercion or worse. 
While some patients provided consent themselves, many others had 
consent forms signed by family members.413 For instance, one twenty-
three-year-old man who already had one child and was described as a 
“borderline mental defective” consented, along with his wife, to his 
sterilization.414 A single, twenty-five-year-old African American 
woman who had a fifth grade education and who was described as 
“sexually promiscuous” and “physically and mentally incapable of 
protecting herself” signed her consent form, along with her sister.415 A 
seventeen-year-old African American girl who was in the Samarcand 
institution and had an I.Q. of fifty-eight had her consent form signed 
by her grandmother.416 Those cases, perhaps representative, suggest 
that even when there was consent by an individual, that individual 
may not have had an adequate understanding of their actions. In 
other cases, the consent was extracted from family members who may 
themselves have been subject to coercion.417 
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C. The 1974 Revisions and the Role of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina 
In the early 1970s, North Carolina continued its retreat from 
sterilization. In 1974 the North Carolina legislature transferred 
jurisdiction over compulsory sterilization to the state courts.418 The 
statute transferred authority to hear the case to the North Carolina 
courts, but maintained the familiar grounds for authorization from 
the 1933 legislation.419 When considering a petition for involuntary 
sterilization, the court could approve the procedure if one of the 
following criteria was met: (1) the sterilization was deemed to be in 
the best interest of the individual or the public good, (2) the 
individual would be likely to have a child with a serious disability or 
the individual could not care for a child, or (3) the next of kin or 
guardian had requested the procedure.420 Thus, the law continued to 
authorize involuntary sterilization when in the best interest of the 
state. 
The new legislation led to a challenge that made its way up to the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1976 in In re Sterilization of 
Moore.421 The case arose from a petition filed by the Forsythe County 
Department of Social Services requesting sterilization of a minor 
child, Joseph Lee Moore, who had an IQ of forty.422 The justification 
for the procedure was that the child, if not sterilized, would likely 
have children with serious disabilities.423 Although the Forsyth 
County Superior Court held the statute to be unconstitutional,424 the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the law.425 In an odd 
juxtaposition of citations, the court cited Roe v. Wade and Buck v. 
Bell in the same sentence.426 But instead of focusing on Roe’s finding 
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 422.  Id. at 96, 221 S.E.2d at 308–09. 
 423.  Id. at 104–05, 221 S.E.2d at 313. 
 424.  Id. at 109, 221 S.E.2d at 316. 
 425.  Id. at 104–05, 221 S.E.2d at 313. 
 426.  Id. at 102, 221 S.E.2d at 312 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Buck 
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)). 
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of a right to control one’s own reproductive rights, the court focused 
on Roe’s finding of a limitation on the right to control one’s own 
reproductive rights after the first trimester. Thus, the court focused 
on Roe’s acknowledgement of the state’s interest in regulating 
reproduction.427 
Amazingly, the court then went on to state that the “welfare of 
all citizens should take precedence over the rights of individuals to 
procreate.”428 Thus, the Supreme Court of North Carolina read Roe’s 
concession that the state could limit the right of choice after the first 
trimester in conjunction with Buck to limit the reproductive freedom 
of a developmentally disabled child. In language reminiscent of the 
eugenics literature of the 1910s and 1920s, the court stated: “It is the 
function of the Legislature, and its duty as well, to enact appropriate 
legislation to protect the public and preserve the race from the known 
effects of the procreation of mentally deficient children by the 
mentally deficient	.	.	.	.”429 The In re Moore opinion also distinguished 
the North Carolina statute from the one struck down in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, because the law applied equally to all developmentally 
disabled persons without distinction.430 
Recognizing the “duty” of the legislature to “preserve the race” 
through the enactment of sterilization laws, the court validated not 
only the North Carolina sterilization law, but also the eugenics 
movement as a whole.431 In re Moore has never been expressly 
overturned, though whether it would survive constitutional muster 
today is questionable.432 It was against this backdrop, with the most 
 
 427.  Id. at 102–03, 221 S.E.2d at 312. 
 428.  Id. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312. 
 429.  Id. (quoting In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Neb. 1968)). 
 430.  Id. at 105, 221 S.E.2d at 313–14. 
 431.  Id. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312; see DAREN BAKST, North Carolina’s Forced-
Sterilization Program: A Case for Compensating the Living Victims, JOHN LOCKE FOUND. 
16 (2011), http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/policyReports/NCeugenics.pdf [https://perma
.cc/PRJ2-LA8W]. Shortly after the decision in In re Sterilization of Moore, a federal 
district court largely upheld the sterilization statute in a constitutional challenge brought 
by the North Carolina Association for Retarded Children and the United States as 
intervener, but struck down the provision allowing the next of kin or guardian to request a 
petition on the person’s behalf. N.C. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 
F. Supp. 451, 458–59 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (invalidating Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1281, sec. 1, 
§	35-39(4),1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 458, 459). 
 432.  While both In re Moore and Buck have been cited as good law in the twenty-first 
century, the cold economic calculations behind these decisions, as well their racial 
underpinnings, have been roundly rejected by modern constitutional jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 427 (2007). But see Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 
F.3d 1124, 1229 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927)) 
(permitting state limitations on reproductive rights of developmentally disabled citizens, 
but still permitting suit for violations of constitutional rights to go forward against state 
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recent opinion of the state’s highest court having bucked the spirit of 
Roe and staked out its support for the eugenics movement, that North 
Carolinians began to uncover and reject this thinking. 
D. The Legacy of Sterilization in North Carolina 
As more people began to understand North Carolina’s eugenics 
program, support grew for the notion that the State should apologize, 
including in monetary terms, to those sterilized by the Eugenics 
Board. One step on the road to pursuing compensation was taking 
stock of just what the State had done, and on what scale, in the name 
of economic expediency. North Carolina oversaw one of “the largest 
and most aggressive sterilization programs” in the country.433 
Between 1929 and 1974, nearly 7,600 men and women were sterilized 
as a result of the program.434 Some of the sterilization victims included 
boys and girls as young as ten years old.435 In part because of the 
legacy of In re Moore, involuntary sterilizations continued as late as 
1980.436 In fact, the statute permitting involuntary sterilizations 
remained in effect in North Carolina until 2003.437 
The sterilization program disproportionately affected certain 
groups. Women accounted for nearly 85% of the sterilization 
victims.438 As Table 4 reveals, over time, the percentage of women 
sterilized increased.439 Although in 1934, as the sterilization 
procedures were being worked out, men were disproportionately 
sterilized (only 34.8% of the people sterilized that year were women), 
and every year after that saw a substantially greater proportion of 
 
actor who coerced developmentally disabled adult to undergo sterilization); Britt v. State, 
363 N.C. 546, 551, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) 
(“Moreover, it is well settled that ‘[a]cting for the public good, the state, in the exercise of 
its police power, may impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural and constitutional 
rights of its citizens.’	” (quoting In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 
312)); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. 1985) (holding a law banning 
such sterilizations to be unconstitutional for “den[ying] incompetent developmentally 
disabled persons rights which are accorded all other persons in violation of state and 
federal constitutional guarantees of privacy”); BAKST, supra note 431, at 16. 
 433.  See Begos, supra note 28. 
 434.  GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 5; Begos, supra 
note 28. 
 435.  See GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 7; Begos, supra 
note 28. 
 436.  See In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 652–54, 263 S.E.2d 805, 808–09 (1980) 
(upholding the involuntary sterilization of a mildly mentally retarded and developmentally 
disabled woman); BAKST, supra note 431, at 13. 
 437.  Act of Apr. 10, 2003, ch. 13, sec. 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 11, 11–12. 
 438.  GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 7. 
 439.  See infra Appendix, Table 4. 
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women than men sterilized.440 By the 1960s, well over 90% of the 
sterilizations were performed on women.441 Although white and 
African American people (and a few Native Americans) were 
sterilized with the approval of the Eugenics Board, African 
Americans were disproportionately sterilized in much of the period 
after World War II.442 In fact, in every biennial report from 1946–1948 
to 1964–1966, the percentage of African Americans sterilized 
increased, from under 20% between 1946–1948 to nearly two-thirds 
between 1964–1966.443 That the program became more focused on 
race in the era of the Civil Rights movement also invites further 
investigation.444 Also, some evidence suggests that race was very much 
on the minds of the state welfare officers charged with implementing 
North Carolina’s eugenics program.445 The percentage of African 
American sterilized certainly increased over the period from 1946–
1948, when fewer than 20% of the people sterilized were African 
American, to 1964–1966, when African Americans accounted for 64% 
of those sterilized. 
VI.  THE CASE FOR REPARATIONS AND LIMITING PRINCIPLES 
A. The North Carolina Reparations Program 
For nearly a decade after Governor Easley’s public apology in 
2002, some advocates in North Carolina quietly pursued 
compensation for those who had been sterilized.446 Then, in 2011, 
Governor Beverly Purdue established a “Governor’s Task Force to 
Determine the Method of Compensation for Victims of North 
 
 440.  See infra Appendix, Table 4 
 441.  See infra Appendix, Table 4 
 442.  See infra Appendix, Table 5. 
 443.  See infra Appendix, Table 4 
 444.  See infra Appendix, Table 4. 
 445.  See, e.g., WOODSIDE, supra note 364, at 83–88 (discussing attitudes towards 
African Americans by county health department workers and those workers’ assessment 
of African Americans). While Woodside herself at several points disclaimed her belief 
that race (as opposed to level of education) was a significant variable, id. at 83, at other 
points she focuses on what she identifies as the different moral standards regarding family 
and sex in the African American and white communities—the former of which she implies 
lie at least partly in the era of slavery. Id. at 83–84. Thus, when she wrote that “[n]or are 
number of children a matter for concern since this type of Negro, lacking incentive and 
opportunity for achievement of a higher standard of living, rarely envisages long-term 
goals and is content to live from day to day, taking whatever comes,” id. at 83–84, it is easy 
to see her assessment of race as central to her assessment of the people she discusses. 
 446.  Jon Ostendorff, Eugenics Victims Closer to Payout, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, 
May 23, 2012, at A1, A6. 
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Carolina’s Eugenics.”447 The Governor’s Task Force recommended 
that each then-living person who was sterilized receive $50,000.448 The 
estates of those who had already passed away would receive nothing 
under this plan. While one might think that the victims would have no 
children, a significant number of people who were sterilized 
conceived children before they were sterilized.449 
In 2012, supporters of compensation introduced a bill, to be 
funded with $10,000,000, to provide each “qualified recipient” with 
$50,000.450 A “qualified recipient” was defined broadly as: “[a]n 
individual who was asexualized or sterilized under the authority of 
the Eugenics Board in accordance with Chapter 224 of the Public 
Laws of 1933 or Chapter 221 of the Public Laws of 1937, and who was 
living on May 16, 2012.”451 So anyone—regardless of the 
circumstances—who was sterilized by order of the Eugenics Board 
and survived until May 2012 would be entitled to compensation. 
However, the nature of the sterilizations that took place in North 
Carolina varied widely, from people who were sterilized involuntarily 
outside of the Eugenics Board,452 to people who were sterilized with 
the permission of their families,453 to people who themselves sought 
out sterilization as a method of family planning.454 One scholar 
 
 447.  GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 4. 
 448.  Id. at 11. 
 449.  Id. at 1. While the number of sterilization victims who had children before 
sterilization is unknown, the North Carolina Governor’s Task Force discussed whether 
victims’ children should receive compensation. See id. at 1. 
 450.  H.R. 947, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012). 
 451.  Id. sec. 1, §	143B-426.50(4). The bill excluded compensation as available assets for 
determination of eligibility for government assistance programs. Id. sec. 1, §	143B-
426.56(a). The bill also provided for redacted records of the Eugenics Board for public 
inspection. Id. sec. 4, §	132-1.23. 
 452.  See, e.g., Rose Hoban, Eugenics Compensation Amendment Continues to Leave 
Some Victims Out, N.C. HEALTH NEWS (May 29, 2015), http://www.northcarolinahealthnews
.org/2015/05/29/eugenics-compensation-amendment-continues-to-leave-some-victims-out/ 
[http://perma.cc/C93Y-Z5BQ] (discussing people who claim to have been sterilized 
outside of the Eugenics Board and, therefore, do not have documentation necessary to 
receive compensation). 
 453.  See Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, §	2, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345 (repealed 2003). 
 454.  See, e.g., SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 119–22 (noting that some petitions to 
Eugenics Board were for family planning and contraceptive purposes). Schoen goes on to 
note that petitions for family planning increased dramatically around 1959 and continued 
through at least 1964. Id. at 122. The 1933 legislation provided that sterilizations pursuant 
to the Eugenics Board were performed at public expense. See Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, 
sec. 2, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 346 (repealed 2003). Thus, sterilizations pursuant to the 
Eugenics Board could be voluntary—through petition by the individual seeking 
sterilization—or compelled. Individuals could have their own physicians perform 
sterilization without any involvement or approval from the Eugenics Board. Id. sec. 11, 
1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 349–50. 
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estimated that perhaps twenty percent of the sterilizations that took 
place after 1960 fell into this latter category.455 The bill passed in the 
North Carolina House of Representatives,456 but failed to pass the 
Senate.457 
In 2013, another bill was introduced in the North Carolina 
General Assembly to provide payments to sterilization victims.458 
There was a serious question as to whether anything had changed in 
the North Carolina Senate. North Carolina State Senator Phil Berger 
recalled of the 2012 debate that “[t]here was no ability to develop 
consensus on one particular path forward.”459 And yet, somehow, the 
North Carolina legislature found $10,000,000 for a public fund for 
reparations to sterilization victims.460 However, the authorizing 
statute has some important limitations; the established fund capped 
liability at $10,000,000.461 As a result, no matter how many people are 
ultimately able to satisfy the requirements for compensation, the 
liability will never go above that amount. Thus, the more people who 
are deemed eligible the smaller the payout to each claimant. 
As enacted, the North Carolina reparations program defines 
eligibility more narrowly than the 2012 bill to include only people 
who were sterilized involuntarily and pursuant to state action by the 
North Carolina’s Eugenics Board.462 These two key limiting principles 
 
 455.  SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 121. 
 456.  House Bill 947: Eugenics Compensation Program, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., http://
www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2011&BillID=S800 [https://
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Senate on June 6, 2012). 
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[https://perma.cc/KVH6-93KX]. 
 461.  §§	143B-426.50 to 426.51.  
 462.  §	143B-426.50(5). 
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have proven to be important. First, people who were sterilized 
involuntarily but outside of the authorization of the Eugenics Board 
are left without recourse. 
Second, only those who were sterilized “involuntarily” are 
eligible—the definition of “involuntary” is critical. Some people 
sought the Eugenics Board’s approval for family planning purposes 
and they are, thus, ineligible. To help resolve the ambiguity in the 
definition of “involuntary,” the North Carolina legislation establishes 
that those who were minors or incompetent are presumed to have 
been sterilized involuntarily and those who were both adults and 
competent are presumed to have been sterilized voluntarily.463 In each 
case, that presumption could be rebutted by a preponderance of the 
evidence.464 However, it is entirely possible that a number of 
competent adults were coerced into agreeing to sterilization.465 
Unfortunately, proving coercion several decades after the fact will 
undoubtedly be difficult, leaving those people without recourse. Thus, 
one major flaw with the legislation is that it leaves many people who 
were coerced into agreeing to sterilization or whose family members 
authorized the sterilization without redress.466 
There is one other important limiting principle: claimants must 
have survived until June 30, 2013, to be eligible.467 That is, there had 
to be a direct, living victim at the time the legislation was being 
debated. The lack of a direct, living victim is a frequent complaint in 
other reparations cases, such as those for slavery and often Jim 
Crow.468 Indeed, the heirs of eugenics victims have recently brought a 
legal challenge, arguing this distinction violates the equal protection 
clause.469 
 
 463.  §	143B-426.50(3)(a). 
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Despite these significant limiting principles, the program does 
provide a precedent for further reparations in other states. This is 
particularly true given that the North Carolina plan also presumes 
that people who were minors or incompetent were sterilized 
involuntarily.470 This presumption likely reflects reality and may 
preference the cases that are most likely to be meritorious. The North 
Carolina Industrial Commission decides whether someone is a 
qualified recipient.471 However, out of nearly 800 claimants, only 220 
people have been deemed qualified.472 At least fifty people are 
appealing their rejection of their claims.473 The initial delays 
associated with the payment of claims prompted the general assembly 
to amend the law to facilitate payments to qualified individuals.474 To 
date, two payments totaling $35,000 have been distributed to each of 
the qualified victims under the program.475 
Following the enactment of the legislation in 2013, there have 
been efforts to address some of the perceived shortfalls of the 
reparations program.476 In particular, there have been several 
legislative efforts to provide reparations to the victims of involuntary 
 
Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2016) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeals and remanding the claim to the 
Industrial Commission for a transfer to the Wake County Superior Court for 
consideration of the law’s constitutionality). The plaintiffs have appealed the decision 
regarding the proper jurisdiction of such disputes to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
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Act and legislative and judicial efforts to expand payments to sterilization victims). 
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sterilizations at the local level.477 County officials have already voiced 
their support for instituting local compensation plans for sterilization 
victims.478 A bill currently pending before the General Assembly 
would allow the state’s four largest counties to pass ordinances to 
compensate victims of involuntary sterilization under the authority of 
local eugenics boards.479 However, these ordinances would be subject 
to several significant limitations under the current legislation. The 
individual counties would be responsible for providing the 
reparations funds and would be under no obligation to compensate 
victims.480 In addition to requiring that claims must be made by 
December 31, 2019, the bill also limits the definition of “qualified 
recipient” to include only claimants who are alive to make a claim.481 
While these legislative solutions are by no means perfect, they 
represent another step in the right direction towards compensating 
victims. 
B. Factors Favoring Legislative Reparations 
One of the important results of the North Carolina legislation is 
that it sets a precedent for other state legislators that are thinking 
about some sort of repair for their own eugenics programs—and 
potentially for other miscarriages of justice outside of the eugenics 
context. There are several key limiting principles that appear in the 
case of state-sponsored eugenics that are useful to identify. Those 
factors may reassure legislatures contemplating reparations that there 
are concrete and important distinguishing factors, so that they are not 
opening up an unlimited set of claims in other cases. Moreover, those 
factors may provide important guideposts in reviewing other 
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reparations claims. Conversely, some of these factors may be too 
limiting and subsequent legislatures may want to drop the limitations. 
Four factors characterize reparations for sterilization from other 
reparations claims and make reparations for sterilization victims 
particularly compelling. First, the government was the bad actor 
here;482 this is not a claim for the type of general societal 
discrimination that is so suspect in modern law.483 Second, the harm is 
extraordinary and of a greater magnitude than many other intrusions 
on personal autonomy and liberty. There are few—if any—other 
episodes in the United States in the twentieth century that involved 
such widespread, intentional government action.484 Third, many 
people at the time knew it was wrong and spoke against 
sterilization.485 Fourth, direct living connections remain between the 
harm and repair.486 Thus, there are some immediate, living 
connections to the injustices imposed those many years ago. 
Why, then, were monetary reparations successful in North 
Carolina’s case when virtually no others were in the past several 
decades? What is it about sterilization that allowed the North 
Carolina legislature to garner substantial bipartisan support? For one, 
the sterilization program was not geared towards one particular race, 
though in practice, one race may have been more affected.487 Second, 
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§§	4215(a), 4218(2) (2012) (limiting eligible individuals to people alive at the date of 
passage of the Act). 
 487.  Claims for reparations for the eras of slavery and segregation have met with 
extraordinary opposition in the public and in legislatures. See, e.g., BROPHY, supra note 
461, at 4–5 (discussing public opinion polls and opposition to race-based reparations). 
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the class of people who would be able to seek reparation funds was 
known to be relatively small. The number of estimated victims still 
alive at the time the legislation was passed (and thus eligible for 
compensation) was 1,500 to 2,000.488 Third, people across the political 
spectrum saw the inhumanity of North Carolina’s eugenics history. 
Perhaps most compelling is the fact that as far back as the 1930s, legal 
scholars and others argued that involuntary sterilizations were 
improper.489 The catalogue of legal history discussed above teaches us 
that people at the time of North Carolina’s sterilization program 
realized that it was wrong. Thus, we are not reading today’s 
sensibilities back onto decisions made by legislators, administrators, 
and judges in the 1930s. 
The North Carolina compensation legislation also offered the 
opportunity for people to criticize whatever group they found 
responsible for this harm. In the case of some conservatives, this was 
the liberal scientists who refused to appreciate religious ideas.490 In 
the case of liberals, this was another episode of the state depriving 
women of their reproductive autonomy.491 The 2013 legislation saw a 
rare moment of unanimity across the political spectrum in terms of 
outrage about the state’s actions, even if not a complete consensus on 
the morality of paying reparations. 
The recent passage of a similar statute to compensate the victims 
of involuntary sterilization in Virginia suggests that North Carolina is 
already serving as a model for states moving forward. On October 30, 
2015, the Virginia General Assembly passed legislation to 
compensate the victims of involuntary sterilizations.492 Largely 
modeled after the North Carolina statute, the Virginia statute 
provides “compensation to individuals who were involuntarily 
sterilized pursuant to the Virginia Eugenical Sterilization Act,” who 
 
 488.  Jim Morrill, Victim Advocates Want to Close Eugenics Loophole, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Jan. 20, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article9262985.html [https://perma.cc/JYJ4-6D2U]. 
 489.  See supra Section IV.A (discussing opposition to sterilizations by law reviews). 
 490.  See Maggie Gallagher, “The Human Betterment League,” NAT’L REV. (Dec. 12, 
2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/285545/human-betterment-league
-maggie-gallagher [https://perma.cc/9GJF-TE2Y]. 
 491.  See Irin Carmon, For Eugenics Sterilization Victims, Belated Justice, MSNBC 
(June 27, 2014, 9:43 PM) http://www.msnbc.com/all/eugenic-sterilization-victims-belated-
justice [https://perma.cc/E2DW-FXG7] 
 492.  See Jenna Portnoy, Va. General Assembly Agrees to Compensate Eugenics 
Victims, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-
politics/va-general-assembly-agrees-to-compensate-eugenics-victims/2015/02/27/b2b7b0ec-
be9e-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html [https://perma.cc/6KX5-A76A]. 
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were alive as of February 1, 2015.493 Similar to the North Carolina 
experience, the legislation attracted broad support from conservatives 
and liberals alike, offering a rare moment of bipartisan consensus.494 
However, the Virginia statute only provides the victims of involuntary 
sterilizations with a lump sum of only $25,000, as opposed to 
$50,000.495 
Additional efforts at the federal and state level continue to 
promote compensation for the victims of state-sponsored sterilization 
programs. The enactment of these two reparations programs has led 
to an outpouring of support for reparations programs within other 
states.496 In Congress, there has been a rare bipartisan effort to ensure 
that payments from current or future state eugenics compensation 
programs are not considered in eligibility determinations for federal 
benefits.497 If enacted, the federal legislation could help facilitate the 
payment of state reparations payments without limiting the 
recipient’s ability to qualify for federal aid programs.498 While these 
developments bode well for the future of legislative reparations in 
other states, time is quickly running out for many of the victims of 
involuntary sterilizations across the country.499 
 
 493.  2015 Appropriations Act, ch. 665, §	1-93, item 307(T)(1), 2015 Va. Acts __, __, 
(2015). 
 494.  See Portnoy, supra note 492. 
 495.  2015 Appropriations Act, ch. 665, §	1-93, item 307(T)(4), 2015 Va. Acts __, __, 
(2015). 
 496.  See, e.g., Mark G. Bold, Editorial, It’s Time for California to Compensate Its 
Forced-Sterilization Victims, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015, 8:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com
/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0306-bold-forced-sterilization-compensation-20150306-story.html [https:
//perma.cc/T283-84A9]; Paul A. Lombardo & Peter L. Hardin, Editorial, Compensate 
Eugenic Sterilization Victims: Column, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2013, 6:03 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/21/eugenics-north-carolina-column/
2662317/ [https://perma.cc/D6BH-GBRC]. 
 497.  See Mark Barrett, Tillis, McHenry File Bills to Help Eugenics Victims, USA 
TODAY (July 16, 2015, 2:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/elections/2015/07/16/thom-
tillis-patrick-mchenry-eugenics-north-carolina/30247131/ [https://perma.cc/TB2D-5EJ4]. 
 498.  The bipartisan legislation, known as the “Treatment of Certain Payments in 
Eugenics Compensation Act,” provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
law, payments made under a State eugenics compensation program shall not be 
considered as income or resources in determining eligibility for, or the amount of, any 
Federal public benefit.” S. 1698, 114th Cong. §	2(a) (2015) (as passed by the Senate, Nov. 
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Press Release, U.S. Congressman Patrick McHenry, McHenry Eugenics Compensation 
Legislation Passes House (July 6, 2016), http://mchenry.house.gov/news/documentsingle
.aspx?DocumentID=398250#sthash.YJoASFTV.dpuf [https://perma.cc/ER6E-HLWP]. 
The legislation has now been referred to the Senate Finance Committee. H.R. 5210, 114th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 2016). 
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C. Designing Future Eugenics Reparations 
In considering reparations legislation elsewhere, states may look 
to a number of factors in designing their programs. Understanding 
how the state’s program functioned is of critical importance. In North 
Carolina, pivotal questions remain about who was selected for 
sterilization; how the administrative agency—the state Eugenics 
Board—operated; and what was the demographic data of those who 
were sterilized. Judging from the Eugenics Board Meeting minutes,500 
the hearings were perfunctory and often no family members 
challenged the petition for sterilization. And rather hauntingly—
though understandably—there were well-established administrative 
procedures for sterilizations, including pre-printed sterilization 
petitions for state officials to complete.501 
Closely related are difficult questions related to the amount of 
coercion (or conversely, consent—if any) involved in the 
sterilizations. As the North Carolina Sterilization Task Force’s final 
report acknowledges, there were varying levels of coercion involved 
in North Carolina’s history.502 For many people the sterilization was 
involuntary; for others there was coercion; and for some (perhaps as 
many as twenty percent during the 1960s) the process was 
“voluntary.”503 Apparently many women, especially in the 1960s, 
sought state-supplied sterilization as a method of family planning. 
How many of those ostensibly “voluntary” requests were coerced in 
some way, or suggested to those requesting them by government 
officials, or family members, is unclear.504 That information may never 
be known. Undoubtedly, some of this state action resulted in some of 
the most outrageous interferences with personal autonomy practiced 
in the United States in the twentieth century. 
Each state will struggle with the question of what the 
compensation program ought to look like. What program would in 
some measure be fair to people whose personal autonomy was so 
deeply affected, so long ago? Obviously no amount of money can 
compensate for some harms. Reparations programs necessarily 
 
 500.  Eugenics Bd., Minutes of the October 25, 1950 Meeting 1–4 (Oct. 25, 1950), http://
www.sterilizationvictims.nc.gov/documents/DCR_Presentation_Handout_B-Sample_Eugenics
_Board_Minutes-October1950.pdf [https://perma.cc/59GT-JW6D] (containing single-sentence 
explanations for decisions regarding sterilization). 
 501.  BROWN, PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURE, supra 
note 43, at 22–24; BROWN, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF EUGENICAL 
STERILIZATION, supra note 43, at 28–30. 
 502.  GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 5. 
 503.  SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 113. 
 504.  Id. (using the term “elective sterilization” to refer to a “voluntary sterilization”). 
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require legislators to balance limited state funds against the desire to 
meaningfully repair and assist those who were unjustifiably harmed 
by the state in a very direct and continuing way. A common approach 
has been to provide money only in those cases where there remains a 
direct, living connection—only to those immediate victims who are 
still alive.505 Moreover, practical considerations favor calculating a 
single figure and giving that to every living victim, rather than trying 
to calibrate harm between victims. The most prominent case of this is 
the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided $20,000 to every 
Japanese American interned during World War II who survived until 
1988.506 This approach had some obvious and unfortunate 
consequences, in that many people who had suffered internment—
and whose descendants had suffered from property loss—received 
nothing. 
Other states now have the opportunity to provide similar 
compensation regimes. They will likely focus on still-living people and 
seek evidence of coercion. Those two principles will limit—perhaps 
too much—the class of claimants. For while the living connection has 
been critical to the North Carolina sterilization compensation 
regime—and to other reparations regimes, such as the compensation 
to Japanese Americans interned during World War II507—the 
requirement of survivorship acts as a barrier to recovery for those 
whose fundamental rights were infringed upon by the state. 
Moreover, the amount of coercion is difficult to prove so many years 
later. Given how much effort the state spent to facilitate “consent,” as 
well as the limited efforts the state made to protect those being 
sterilized, it is reasonable to presume that victims and their families 
were coerced. At any rate, any ambiguities should be at least resolved 
in favor of those who were sterilized. 
There is something else that did not appear in the North 
Carolina act, but that would be very useful and positive: a 
comprehensive study of just what happened. Many outstanding 
questions regarding the administration of the sterilization program 
can only be answered, if at all, by looking at records that are within 
the Eugenics Board’s archives. Those records are kept hidden for the 
legitimate privacy concerns of family members and the sterilization 
 
 505.  See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §§	4215(a)(1), 4218(2) (2012); see 
also Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 814–15 (2006). 
 506.  Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §	4215(a) (2012); see also Alfred L. Brophy, 
Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 814 (2006). 
 507.  See BROPHY, supra note 468, at 44 (noting that only those who were interned 
during World War II and survived until 1986 were eligible for compensation). 
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victims themselves. Nevertheless, a state legislature can order and 
fund a study of those records, so that in addition to compensating the 
victims we can all know the full measure of what happened. Such a 
study would help us understand how appeals to white supremacy and 
“cost-benefit” analyses led to legislature-mandated, judiciary-
approved, and administratively routinized eugenics programs across 
our nation in the twentieth century. We remain skeptical that such a 
study would take place given its potential to threaten the integrity of 
the state’s claim that it has settled and made amends for its decades-
long intrusion on personal autonomy in the name of the economic 
efficiency. 
What, then, should future legislative action designed to repair for 
state-sponsored eugenics look like? We believe that legislatures 
should establish fixed amounts for each individual who was sterilized 
pursuant to state-sponsored eugenics programs. Those who sought 
out sterilization as part of family planning could be excluded from 
compensation, but there should at least be a rebuttable presumption 
that individuals sterilized pursuant to the requests of state (or local 
government officials) are eligible for compensation. Given the 
extensive and disturbing history of government-encouraged 
sterilization, the burden should be firmly on government actors to 
show that sterilization was voluntary rather than coercive. 
There are two particularly difficult questions about designing 
reparations plans for other states that have emerged from North 
Carolina’s experience. First, there is a question about people who 
were sterilized outside of the actions of state actors. That is, there 
seem to be instances of women who were sterilized outside of the 
Eugenics Board and outside of the county authorities.508 This is an 
issue of local physicians acting independently. Even determining the 
number of cases like this is difficult, but some anecdotal evidence 
suggests they happened.509 One might reasonably argue that the state 
should pay for those cases on the theory that the state authorities 
helped establish the environment in which this could happen.510 Such 
an approach would expand the scope of compensation beyond the 
boundary of “state action,” but would be consistent with full repair 
 
 508.  Eric Mennel, Payments Start for N.C. Victims, But Many Won’t Qualify, NPR 
(Oct. 31, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/10/31/360355784/
payments-start-for-n-c-eugenics-victims-but-many-wont-qualify [https://perma.cc/2X4J-C8NQ]. 
 509.  Id. 
 510.  See, e.g., Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, sec. 11, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 349–50 
(explicitly providing for individuals to have their own physicians perform sterilization). 
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for the legal and political environment that told disabled individuals 
their welfare was less important than the public treasury. 
The second difficult issue that has emerged from North 
Carolina’s experience is the question of whether compensation should 
be limited to those who are still alive. That living connection was a 
key limiting principle for the North Carolina legislation—and likely 
made it possible to pass laws that otherwise might have had thousands 
of claimants.511 However, that limiting principle also serves to 
dramatically reduce the reparative scope of the program. There is 
good reason to expand the program at least to immediate relatives of 
those who were sterilized, such as surviving spouses and children. 
Such an expansion would keep many of the values inherent in 
requiring a living survivor because there are people quite closely 
connected to the sterilized individual. It is likely those people suffered 
some of—and in the case of surviving spouses the exact same—the 
emotional pain as sterilized individual. 
What remains to be done, in addition to compensation, is to 
recover a full story of just how the sterilization programs operated, as 
state legislatures struggle to assess and repair for some of the most 
egregious interferences with personal autonomy in the twentieth-
century United States. This is a particularly difficult issue because the 
legacy of eugenics casts a shadow over contemporary discussions of 
reproductive freedom. Unsurprisingly, many in the African American 
community in particular find the legacy of state-sponsored 
sterilization a disturbing warning about the potential for state control 
of reproductive rights.512 Thus, redress for the era of eugenics may be 
necessary not just as a case of doing justice to individuals sterilized, 
but also to regain legitimacy for the state going forward as it deals 
with issues of reproductive freedom, particularly for women from 
historically marginalized communities. In order to restore the 
confidence and security among North Carolina women that their 
reproductive rights will be protected in the future, the state must 
demonstrate that it recognizes the past intrusions on reproductive 
freedom were wrong and is committed to repairing the damage.513  
 
 511.  See Carmon, supra note 491. 
 512.  See, e.g., SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 70 (discussing skepticism in the African 
American community about state-sponsored family planning). 
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CONCLUSION 
We have placed the North Carolina Eugenics program in the 
context of the national movement for eugenics that grew in the early 
twentieth century. The national movement emerged from a set of 
factors, including the desire to respond to the cost of government care 
for disabled individuals, a concern for public money over personal 
autonomy, and a fear of the loss of white supremacy. Though the 
movement initially faced opposition in the state courts, after the 
United States Supreme Court’s 1927 opinion in Buck v. Bell, state 
courts and legislatures increasingly approved eugenics programs. The 
North Carolina legislature established a Eugenics Board in 1933 to 
approve state-provided sterilizations and the Board established an 
elaborate administrative apparatus to process petitions from state 
officials seeking permission to sterilize disable institutionalized 
individuals, as well as North Carolinians living in the community. This 
regime resulted in the sterilization of approximately 7,600 people.514 
While most frequently the Board processed applications where the 
individuals or their family members had “consented” to sterilization, 
in a relatively small percentage of cases from the 1930s to the middle 
of the 1950s, the Board approved sterilization even over the 
objections of individuals and their families. 
The attention that scholars and journalists brought to the legacy 
of state-sponsored sterilization led to legislation providing 
compensation to those who were still-living as of 2013 and could 
demonstrate that they were sterilized pursuant to action by the state 
Eugenic Board. While the legislation has been criticized by some 
survivors who were sterilized without the authorization of the 
Eugenics Board, it has already provided a model for other states 
seeking to redress their own legacies of eugenics. North Carolina, 
which was once a leading jurisdiction for sterilization, is now once 
again leading the way; this time, in addressing what to do about that 
shameful legacy. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Table 1: Percentage of Sterilized North Carolinians in Institutions, 
1930–1966515 
 
Year Institutionalized Non-Institutionalized 
Institutionalized 
(%) 
1930 9 5 64% 
1931 3 4 43% 
1932 15 3 83% 
1933 2 2 50% 
1934 45 15 75% 
1935 82 85 49% 
1936 56 37 60% 
1937 82 42 66% 
1938 152 48 76% 
1939 70 59 54% 
1940 94 59 61% 
1941 103 73 59% 
1942 98 43 70% 
1943 107 41 72% 
1944 63 39 62% 
1945 74 42 64% 
1946 47 57 45% 
1947 65 69 49% 
1948 92 96 49% 
1949 109 135 45% 
1950 187 111 63% 
1951 255 112 69% 
1952 213 134 61% 
1953 115 168 41% 
1954 128 170 43% 
1955 127 165 43% 
1956 70 147 32% 
1957 81 224 27% 
 
 515.  1966 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 27–28. 
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Year Institutionalized Non-Institutionalized 
Institutionalized 
(%) 
1958 75 243 24% 
1959 45 215 17% 
1960 49 185 21% 
1961 34 214 14% 
1962 37 193 16% 
1963 36 204 15% 
1964 49 207 19% 
1965 26 141 16% 
1966 7 70 9% 
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B. Table 2: Percentage of Petitions Presented Without Consent of 
Individual Family Member in Biennial Periods, 1934–1966516 
 
Years 
Total 
Petitions 
Presented
Petitions 
Granted 
Petitions 
Without 
Consent
Involuntary 
Petitions 
(%) 
1934–1936 309 301 54 17.5 
1936–1938 356 350 20 5.6 
1938–1940 352 345 23 6.5 
1940–1942 390 385 12 3.1 
1942–1944 328 309 11 3.4 
1944–1946 282 276 10 3.5 
1946–1948 337 330 16 4.8 
1948–1950 562 543 21 3.7 
1950–1952 743 796 25 3.4 
1952–1954 673 650 30 4.5 
1954–1956 657 634 –† –† 
1956–1958 674 658 –† –† 
1958–1960 576 564 –† –† 
1960–1962 558 531 –† –† 
1962–1964 591 545 –† –† 
1964–1966 461 368 –† –† 
 
 
 516.  See generally EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 1–16 BIENNIAL REPORT (1936–1966) 
(providing the underlying aggregate data on the petitions presented before the Eugenics 
Board). 
† Number of petitions without consent were not reported after the 1952–1954 biennial 
report. See generally EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 9–16 BIENNIAL REPORT (1954–1966) 
(providing the underlying aggregate data on sterilizations in North Carolina during this 
period).  
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C. Table 3: Percentage of Petitions for Sterilization Authorized by 
North Carolina Eugenics Board in Biennial Periods, 1934–1965517 
 
Years Total Petitions Presented 
Petitions 
Granted 
Authorized 
Petitions (%) 
1934–1936 309 301 97% 
1936–1938 356 350 99% 
1938–1940 352 345 98% 
1940–1942 390 385 99% 
1942–1944 328 309 94% 
1944–1946 282 276 98% 
1946–1948 337 330 98% 
1948–1950 562 543 97% 
1950–1952 743 796 107%† 
1952–1954 673 650 97% 
1954–1956 657 634 96% 
1956–1958 674 658 98% 
1958–1960 576 564 98% 
1960–1962 558 531 95% 
1962–1964 591 545 92% 
1964–1966 461 368 80% 
 
 
 517.  1966 BIENNIAL REPORT: supra note 362, at 25. The data are reported from July 
of the first year through June of the concluding year. See id. 
† The 1950–1951 numbers seem to reflect petitions from an earlier period that were acted 
on in the 1950–1951 period, when the Eugenics Board was aggressively pursuing its 
missions. See 1952 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 395, at 8–10. 
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D. Table 4: Sterilization by Gender, 1929–1966518 
 
Year Total Men Women Women as Total % 
1929 3 2 1 33.3% 
1930 17 2 15 88.2% 
1931 11 0 11 100% 
1932 18 9 9 50% 
1933 4 1 3 75% 
1934 23 15 8 34.8% 
1935 178 24 154 86.5% 
1936 98 12 86 87.8% 
1937 128 21 107 83.6% 
1938 202 56 146 72.3% 
1939 138 36 102 73.9% 
1940 159 47 112 70.4% 
1941 181 49 132 72.9% 
1942 148 36 112 75.7% 
1943 152 33 119 78.3% 
1944 105 18 87 82.9% 
1945 117 18 99 84.6% 
1946 106 16 90 84.9% 
1947 140 26 114 81.4% 
1948 189 34 155 82.0% 
1949 249 31 218 87.6% 
1950 300 60 240 80% 
1951 372 106 266 71.5% 
1952 348 106 266 76.4% 
1953 283 40 243 85.9% 
1954 298 45 253 84.9% 
1955 292 75 217 74.3% 
1956 217 43 174 80.2% 
 
 518.  1966 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 392, at 26. Data for 1944 were corrected 
using 1944–1946 Biennial Report. See R. EUGENE BROWN, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 6 
BIENNIAL REPORT: JULY 1, 1944 TO JUNE 30, 1946, at 11 (1946), https://ia600201.us
.archive.org/30/items/biennialreporteug06nort/biennialreporteug06nort.pdf [https://perma
.cc/GUU6-NWTJ]. 
 
94. N.C. L. REV. 1871 (2016) 
2016] EUGENICS MOVEMENT IN N.C. 1955 
Year Total Men Women Women as Total % 
1957 305 52 253 83.0% 
1958 318 29 289 90.9% 
1959 260 22 238 91.5% 
1960 234 9 225 96.2% 
1961 248 8 240 96.8% 
1962 230 8 222 96.5% 
1963 240 7 233 97.1% 
1964 256 2 254 99.2% 
1965 167 3 164 98.2% 
1966 77 2 75 97.4% 
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E. Table 5: Sterilizations by Race in Biennial Periods, 1946–1966519 
 
Years Operations Performed White Black 
Native 
American % Black 
1946–
1948 
291 
238 53 
0 18.2% 
1948–
1950 
468 
366 100 
2 21.4% 
1950–
1952 
704 
531 171 
2 24.3% 
1952–
1954 
626 
423 202 
1 32.3% 
1954–
1956 
556 
357 198 
1 35.6% 
1956–
1958 
562 
284 274 
4 48.8% 
1958–
1960 
534 
209 315 
11 59.0% 
1960–
1962 
467 
179 284 
4 60.8% 
1962–
1964 
507 
150 323 
14 63.7% 
1964–
1966 
356 
124 228 
4 64.0% 
 
 
 
 519.  See generally EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 7–16 BIENNIAL REPORT (1946–1966) 
(providing the underlying aggregate data on sterilizations by race). 
